

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP SIX
TASK GROUP 78.1 * BRUNEI ATTACK GROUP

REPORT OF

AMPHIBIOUS ATTACK ON
BRUNEI, BORNEO



127996

7 8882

CONFIDENTIAL



DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

FILE NO. **A16-3(1)/(05)**

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP SIX
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SERIAL **0322**

1s

Reg. No. 2035
R. S. No. _____

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1945

From: Commander Task Group 78.1 (Commander Amphibious Group SIX).
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 78 (Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force).
(2) Commander Task Force 77 (Commander SEVENTH Fleet).
Subject: Action Report, CTG 78.1 (ComPhibGrpSIX) - BRUNEI BAY, BORNEO, Operation (10 - 17 June 1945).
Reference: (a) Article 874(6), U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
(b) Com7thPhib Conf. Ltr., serial 0563 of 10 March 1945.
Enclosures: (A) Commander Task Group 78.1 (Commander Amphibious Group SIX) Action Report on BRUNEI BAY, BORNEO, Operation (10 - 17 June 1945).
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded in compliance with references (a)
and (b).

Paul F. Dugan
PAUL F. DUGAN,
Acting.

7 0322

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

DISTRIBUTION

CominCh (1 advance)	(8)	ComAir7thFlt	(2)	MarCorps School	(1)
CinCPOA	(5)	ComSerFor7thFlt	(2)	Naval War School	(1)
CinCSWPA	(5)	ComDesPac	(2)	Army-Navy Staff College	(1)
Com3rdFlt	(2)	ComSupAirPhibsPac	(2)	Army Command & General Staff School	(1)
Com7thFlt (1 advance)	(8)	ComPhibGrp 1	(2)	JICPOA	(1)
ComGenPOA	(2)	ComPhibGrp 2	(2)	ComCruDiv 15	(2)
ComAirPac	(1)	ComPhibGrp 3	(2)	ComDesRon 21	(2)
Com5thFlt	(2)	ComPhibGrp 4	(2)	ComDesRon 22	(2)
ComPhilSeaFron	(2)	ComPhibGrp 5	(2)	ComDesDiv 28	(2)
ComSWPSeaFron	(2)	ComPhibGrp 7	(2)	ComDesDiv 42	(1)
ComPhibsPac	(2)	ComPhibGrp 8	(2)	ComLCTGrp 74	(1)
ComAdComPhibsPac	(2)	ComPhibGrp 9	(2)	ComLSTFlot 8	(1)
Com7thPhibFor	(5)	ComPhibGrp 10	(2)	ComLSTFlot 24	(1)
ComAdCom7thPhibFor	(2)	ComPhibGrp 11	(2)	ComLSTFlot 15	(1)
Com3rdPhibFor	(2)	ComPhibGrp 12	(2)	ComLSTGrp 43	(1)
ComFwdAreaCenPac	(1)	ComPhibGrp 13	(2)	ComLCSFlot 1	(2)
ComMTBRons7thFlt	(1)	ComPhibTraPac	(4)	ComLSMFlot 7	(1)
ComGenEIGHTHArmy	(1)	ComMTBRon 9	(1)	ComLCIFlot 8	(1)
ComGen1stAustCorps	(2)	ComMTBRon 36	(1)	ComMinDiv 34	(1)
ComGen9thAustDiv	(2)	Com7thPhibTraGrp	(2)	CTU 78.1.6 (LACHLAN)	(1)
AD RAAF Com	(2)	ComPhibTraLant	(2)	USS ROCKY MOUNT	(2)
ComGen13thAF	(2)	CNO(ONI)	(2)	ComTransDiv 103	(1)
ComServPac	(2)	CNO	(2)	USS TITANIA	(1)
		MarCorps	(1)	HMAS WESTRALIA	(1)
Authenticated		ComCortDiv 74	(1)	HMAS MANOORA	(1)
		ComCortDiv 77	(1)		

J. M. Hannan
J. M. HANNAN,
Flag Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (A) TO COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP SIX SERIAL 0322
CTG 78.1 (COMPHIBGRPSIX) ACTION REPORT
ON BRUNEI BAY, BORNEO, OPERATION (10-17 JUNE 1945)

<u>CONTENTS</u>	<u>Page</u>
CONTENTS	a-b
LIST OF DIRECTIVES	c
PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE	1-21
A. Summary	1-9
B. Composition of BRUNEI, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP	9-16
C. Planning, Rehearsal and Pre-Assault Phase	16-21
PART II - CHRONOLOGY	22-38
PART III - ORDNANCE	39
A. Performance of Own Ordnance	39
B. Performance of Enemy Ordnance	39
PART IV - DAMAGE	40
A. Damage to Own Forces	40
B. Damage to Enemy Shipping	40
PART V - SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	41-76
A. Naval Gunfire Support	41-43
B. Air Support	43-48
1. Organization and Control	43-45
2. Narrative	45-48
C. TROOPS AND CARGO	49-53
1. Loading Narrative	49-51
2. Unloading Narrative	51-52
3. Unloading Report	53
D. Landing Craft Control, Ship to Shore Movement, and Beach Organization	54-57
1. Landing Craft Control	54
2. Ship to Shore Movement	54-55
3. Beach Organization	55-57
E. Fighter Direction	58-
1. Organization	58
2. Narrative	58
F. Communications	59-60
G. Logistics	61-64
1. Preliminary	61
2. Logistics at MOROTAI	61-62
3. Logistics En Route to the Objective	62
4. Logistics at the Objective	62-64

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS

<u>PART V - (continued)</u>	<u>Page</u>
H. <u>Medical</u>	65-67
1. Preparation	65
2. Activities En Route	66
3. Activities at the Objective	66-67
I. <u>Intelligence</u>	67-69
1. Planning	67-68
2. Objective Area	68-69
J. <u>Press Relations</u>	70
K. <u>Comments and Recommendations</u>	71-76
1. Naval Gunfire Support	71
2. Unloading	71
3. Air Support	72-73
4. Fighter Direction	73-74
5. Communications	74
6. Medical	74-75
7. Intelligence	75-76
 PART VI - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE	 76
PART VII - PICTORIAL SECTION	76

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION REPORT OF BRUNEI BAY, BORNEO, OPERATION (10 - 17 June 1945)

LIST OF DIRECTIVES

1. CANF SWPA (Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area)
Operation Plans Nos. 8-45 and 10-45.
2. ComSEVENTHPhibFor (Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force) Operation Plan
No. 11-45.
3. ComPhibGrpSIX (Commander Amphibious Group SIX) Movement and Approach
Order No. A605-45.
4. ComPhibGrpSIX (Commander Amphibious Group SIX) Attack Order No. A606-45.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. SUMMARY.

1. On 4 June 1945 at 1400, the BRUNEI Attack Group under the command of Rear Admiral Forrest B. ROYAL in his flagship, U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT, departed MOROTAI for the objective area. The mission of this Attack Group was to transport, protect, land, firmly establish on shore the 9th Australian Division in the BRUNEI BAY Area and support it in subsequent operations in order to secure BRUNEI BAY for use as an advanced fleet base and to protect resources in the area. The assault troops were the veteran 9th Australian Division and such supporting elements, equipment and supplies as would be needed immediately on ZEBRA Day. The assault echelon contained 85 ships with an additional screening force of 6 DDs, 3 DEs, 2 PCs and 4 SCs. A second echelon consisting mainly of LSTs and LCIs plus escorts departed MOROTAI on 5 June and arrived at BRUNEI BAY on 11 June. Other units including LCMs and LCTs sailed from TARAKAN via TAWI TAWI and also arrived on 11 June. One MTERon with its tender from MINDORO joined the main assault echelon at sea on 9 June.
2. The BRUNEI Attack Group, enjoying fair weather, sailed without incident through the CELEBES and SULU SEAS, and overcame the navigational difficulties presented by BASILAN and BALABAC STRAITS without mishap. Although air protection was provided, and dawn and dusk alerts maintained, no enemy planes appeared enroute and no submarine contacts were reported by the screening vessels.
3. On 9 June (ZEBRA minus One), off the northwest coast of BORNEO, the convoy was joined by U.S.S. BOISE (CL-47), carrying General of the Army Douglas MacARTHUR, CincSWPA, to observe the landings at BRUNEI BAY. BOISE was escorted by the KILLEN (DD-593) and A. W. GRANT (DD-649).
4. (a) The Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group which had departed MOROTAI on 2 June arrived off BRUNEI BAY in the early morning of 7 June. This unit began operations under the protection of the Cruiser Covering Force and Fire Support Group commanded by Rear Admiral BERKEY which departed SUBIC BAY on 5 June and arrived at Point KAREN, near BRUNEI BAY Area, at dawn on the 7th. This force, TG 74.3, consisted of NASHVILLE, PHOENIX, HOBART, CONNER, CHARRETTE, BELL, BURNS, and ARUNTA. On 7 June the minesweepers under the command of Lt. Comdr. FONICK, Commander Mine Division 34, began sweeping operations and swept 34 contact mines on a north-south line at the main (southwestern) entrance to BRUNEI BAY in Area PICCOLO. Areas CORNET, TRUMPET, BASSOON and FLUTE were swept with negative results. Preliminary hydrographic survey work by HMAS LACHLAN, commanded by Lt. Comdr. TANCRED, RAN, indicated that

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. SUMMARY.

4. (a) (continued)

British Admiralty charts were accurate for the area. All scheduled operations were completed without enemy interference. Several large smoke columns in the vicinity of BRUNEI town indicated that the enemy had begun the destruction of installations in that area.

5. (a) On 8 June minesweeping operations continued on schedule and 34 contact mines were swept in Area PICCOLO making a total of 68 mines swept through the second day of operations. During the afternoon of 8 June, SALUTE (AM-294) struck a mine which resulted in serious damage. Casualties were reported as 6 enlisted men killed, 3 enlisted men missing in action, and 37 wounded. She subsequently sank at 2300 the same day in position 05-08.5 N, 115-05 E, the spot being marked with an obstruction buoy. Reconnaissance of BROWN Beach, LABUAN ISLAND, was carried out by Underwater Demolition Team No. 11. Swimmers closed to the high water mark along the entire beach, and found a firm sandy bottom. A thorough search revealed no underwater obstacles or mines, and there was little sign of recent activity along the beach. Light enemy opposition on shore inflicted no casualties. Planes of a scheduled bombing strike which failed to check in with Advance Commander Support Air in the NASHVILLE dropped their bombs in the water off BROWN Beach while the swimmers were approaching the beach and inflicted casualties to the extent of 1 missing and 3 wounded. Buoys number 6 to 16, inclusive, were placed in position, and the original beacon on the outer shoal was found still in position.

- (b) Reconnaissance of GREEN Beach by SEVENTH PhibFor Amphibious Scout Team and Australian Survey personnel from HMAS LACHLAN revealed a sandy bottom with a gradual gradient. No obstructions or mines were found and the beach was marked with small white flags on either flank.

- (c) On the same day, the Fire Support Group gave the various landing beach areas a thorough bombardment. PHOENIX and CONNER plus gunboats gave BROWN Beach good coverage and exploded a large ammunition dump. HOBART, CHARRETTE, and BURNS covered the WHITE Beach area destroying several suspected gun emplacements and other targets.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. SUMMARY.

6. (a) On 9 June, Areas TROMBONE, XYLOPHONE, DRUM, HARP, HORN, and PICCOLO in BRUNEI BAY were swept with negative results. 1 mine was swept at the southern boundary of Area PICCOLO during a check-sweep making a total of 69 mines swept through the 3rd day of operations. SCUFFLE (AM-298) reported that the explosion of mines in gear streamed to 60-foot depth might indicate that an anti-sweep feature was used by the enemy to blow the mines when they were caught by the sweeping gear. A reconnaissance of WHITE Beach, MUARA ISLAND, by HMAS LACHLAN, revealed a hard sandy bottom with no obstructions or mines. Buoys 17, 18 and 19 were laid as hydrographic boats made a complete circuit of MUARA ISLAND unmo-
lest. Soundings agreed with the charts. BROOKETON wharves were found in good condition and the South Channel was considered suitable for LSTs with careful handling. It was discovered generally over the BRUNEI BAY area that high tide appeared as much as 90 minutes later than anticipated.
- (b) BROWN, GREEN, and WHITE Beach Areas were again well covered by naval gunfire and a suspected gun emplacement on PAPPAN ISLAND was thoroughly saturated. Heavy air strikes on LABUAN ISLAND and BRUNEI BLUFF drew light inaccurate ack ack. LCI(G) 23 ran hard aground south of MUARA ISLAND. Commander of WHITE Support Unit assisted by PTs stood by until she could get off at high tide.
- (c) 4 PTs arrived in BRUNEI BAY at 1500 and commenced patrolling the objective area. 2 boats strafed SIPITANG town the night of the 9th with no return fire. The other 2 boats patrolled with no enemy contacts to MANGALONG RIVER.
- (d) On 9 June it was learned that the Japanese heavy cruiser, ASHIGARA, had been sunk at 1242/I, 8 June, by the British submarine, TREN-
CHANT, in position 01-59 S, 104-57 E. This removed almost beyond peradventure the possibility of a surprise sortie by enemy fleet units against our forces at BRUNEI BAY.
7. (a) On ZEBRA Day (10 June), the BRUNEI Attack Group sailed into BRUNEI BAY in the early morning hours under the protecting guns of the Fire Support Group. At Point LAMB, inside the Bay, the assault units broke off and proceeded to the respective Transport Areas to deploy in accordance with directives of the Assault Unit Commanders.
- (b) After the BROWN Assault Unit had taken up its position off LABUAN ISLAND, it was attacked by an enemy plane at 0650. This plane, identified as a twin-engine Nick, dropped one bomb near the Transport Area without damage to shipping. The plane was at about 500 ft. altitude, was fired upon, but managed to get away.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. SUMMARY.

- (c) The bombardment of BROWN Beach began at 0805 by the large fleet units of Fire Support Unit ONE, being joined at 0810 by the small support craft with rockets and guns of smaller calibre. Fire Support Unit TWO under CTG 74.3 began the bombardment of WHITE and GREEN Beaches at 0813 and 0815, respectively. Fire at all three points was so heavy and accurate that enemy troops retreated from the landing areas, enabling landings at all three beaches to be made unopposed. The hulk of a Maru in VICTORIA HARBOR was hit repeatedly by close support craft to insure that there were no operational guns aboard to fire on our landing craft. (An inspection tour of the BROWN Beach Area on the afternoon of ZEBRA Day by Chief of Staff and party revealed that naval and aerial bombardment had covered the area with mathematical precision.)
- (d) At 0915, the first waves in LCVPs and LVTs landed simultaneously at BROWN, GREEN, and WHITE Beaches, on schedule. These three separate landings, at different points as far apart as 18 miles, were carried out with precision and dispatch. The beaches were quickly secured and all assault waves were landed by 1003, with the remaining waves on call. Fire support from naval craft was reported to be most effective as was that of the close support craft near shore. B-24s, although somewhat delayed in arriving, carried out attacks on areas in rear of the beaches with good results.
- (e) After the BROWN Beach Area was secured at 1100/I, General of the Army MacARTHUR went ashore from U.S.S. BOISE, accompanied by Lt. Gen. MORSHEAD, GOC I Australian Corps, Rear Admiral ROYAL, Air Vice Marshal BOSTOCK, General KENNEY, and others, for an inspection tour of LABUAN ISLAND.
- (f) The LSMs began unloading on BROWN Beach before 1200 and the LSTs at approximately 1500.
- (g) VICTORIA town on LABUAN ISLAND was found deserted and almost completely destroyed. Australian Infantry and Tanks moved inland from BROWN Beach against little opposition and by 1129 the 24th Brigade was within sight of LABUAN airfield. From this point on the opposition increased. MUARA ISLAND was completely reconnoitered without locating any enemy. At GREEN Beach by nightfall the Australians had captured BROOKETON and had advanced 3,000 yards toward BRUNEI town. At 1724 troops were landed on HAMILTON PENINSULA, LABUAN ISLAND, and at 1830 Major General WOOTTEN, GOC 9th Australian Division assumed command ashore.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. SUMMARY.

- (h) During minesweeping on ZEBRA Day, 3 mines were swept in Area BANJO, making a total of 72 mines swept to date.
- 8. Before nightfall of ZEBRA Day the transports and cruisers moved out to the middle of BRUNEI BAY to anchor in Transport Area TARE as a precaution against enemy planes and suicide craft. Support craft and ships of the screen (TU 78.1.2) formed two concentric screening circles around the anchorage area as anti-aircraft, anti-submarine, and anti-boat protection.
- 9. (a) On 11 June a YMS Unit in Area BANJO, off LABUAN ISLAND, swept 25 contact mines making a total of 97 mines swept since the beginning of the operation. There were 9 gear casualties from uncharted pinnacles. Areas TENOR, CELLO, CHIMES, and VIOLIN were swept with negative results.
- (b) During the morning, General of the Army MacARTHUR, Lt. Gen. MORSHEAD, Rear Admiral ROYAL, and Maj. Gen. WOOTTEN inspected BROOKETON area including GREEN and WHITE Beaches.
- (c) During the day, troops of the 24th Brigade advanced 3500 yards north of LABUAN airstrip encountering opposition to the west and northwest. In the GREEN Beach area troops advanced 7400 yards southwest on the BRUNEI Road and those on HAMILTON PENINSULA went forward 800 yards. MUARA ISLAND was reported secured. A total of 30 Australian casualties were reported to date in all sections.
- (d) B-24s and Beaufighters continued to bomb and strafe in the various areas as directed by Commander Support Air in ROCKY MOUNT.
- (e) During the night of 10/11 June, PTs strafed TUTONG, SERIA, KUALA BELAIT, LUTONG, and MIRI. Damage was inflicted without drawing any enemy fire. The Japs were observed to be setting fire to oil wells and tanks in the SERIA area. PT patrols within BRUNEI BAY were negative, and were discontinued after this day's work.
- (f) During the day the LSIs and the one AKA were unloaded and departed. LST unloading progressed rather slowly owing to slow handling ashore.
- (g) An SRD party reported that 50 Japs armed with machine guns and rifles landed at MENUMBOK.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. SUMMARY.

- (h) General of the Army MacARTHUR, in company with Rear Admirals ROYAL and BERKEY, Lt. General MORSHEAD, and other senior officers, inspected the MUARA-BRUNEI BLUFF-BROOKETON Area. Upon his departure from the BRUNEI BAY Area on the same day in the U.S.S. BOISE, General of the Army MacARTHUR sent the following message: "FOR GENERAL MORSHEAD X ADMIRAL ROYAL X ADMIRAL BERKEY AND VICE MARSHAL BOSTOCK X THE EXECUTION OF THE BRUNEI BAY OPERATION HAS BEEN FLAWLESS X PLEASE ACCEPT FOR YOURSELF AND CONVEY TO YOUR OFFICERS AND MEN THE PRIDE AND GRATIFICATION I FEEL IN SUCH A SPLENDID PERFORMANCE X SIGNED MACARTHUR".
- 10. (a) On 12 June, 5 additional mines were swept in Area BANJO, bringing the total to 102. Other areas in BRUNEI BAY were swept with negative results.
- (b) HOBART and METCALF effectively bombarded towns on the southern tip of KLIAS PENINSULA.
- (c) Air strikes were staged on target areas in the objective area as well as BEAUFORT, WESTON, and KENINGAU. Good support was furnished to ground troops.
- (d) The Australian lines on LABUAN remained virtually unchanged. However, good advances were made toward BRUNEI town resulting in the capture of BRUNEI airstrip. HAMILTON PENINSULA was completely secured. Australian casualties to date totaled 15 killed and 49 wounded.
- (e) General unloading of shipping was proceeding at a satisfactory rate.
- (f) There were indications that the enemy might be staging an evacuation of JESSELTON where some small ship activity was reported.
- (g) On the night of 11/12 June, PTs again strafed MIRI and TUTONG starting fires. Boats received return machine gun and rifle fire from MIRI without damage to the craft.
- 11. (a) On 13 June, in minesweeping operations of MIRI-LUTONG-BARAM POINT Area, AMs swept 31 contact mines on first sweep, losing 5 sets of gear from mine explosions. An additional 61 mines were swept later this same day making a total of 92 for the day. Additional sweeping gear was requested by Commander Minesweeping Unit because of the heavy loss of gear to mine explosions since the beginning of operations on 7 June. While sweeping, the AMs were fired upon by 3" guns ashore. About 25 rounds were fired, all falling short. The battery ceased fire when DDs headed in toward the shore. They were unable to close within range due to floating mines.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. SUMMARY.

- (b) METCALF bombarded caves and gun positions in hills on northern end of LABUAN. The caves appeared unused and the gun positions unoccupied.
 - (c) The 20th Brigade captured BRUNEI Town, and made further advances on LABUAN ISLAND occupying the road west of TIMBALAI airfield and also advancing two-thirds of the way up the east coast.
 - (d) Mitchells and Lightnings rendered support to ground troops. One Dinah approached our aircraft which were strafing MIRI airstrip, but retired when fired upon. One Nick was shot down over BRUNEI BAY at 1934/I by night fighters capably vectored by fighter director team in SPENCER (CGC-36).
 - (e) The night of 13/14 June, PTs strafed CAPE LOBANG and MIRI. They reported receiving either 75mm or 90mm return fire from vicinity of PUJUT.
12. (a) On 14 June, minesweepers off MIRI cut 29 contact mines on first sweep. A total of 72 mines were swept this day, giving 164 to date in this area. SCRIMMAGE lost all gear and SCOUT and SENTRY were able to sweep with starboard gear only. YMS vessels had such difficulty in cutting mine moorings that they planned to use explosive cutters. Mines caught in YMS gear slowed ships almost to a stop. Mines appeared deeply set and thickly planted. AMs drew fire from beach on first pass, but the remainder of day was quiet.
- (b) 24th Brigade advanced to northern tip of LABUAN, and advanced down BRUNEI-TUTONG Road with little opposition.
 - (c) All assault shipping was unloaded as of this date. However, the Reserve Unit was not yet committed.
 - (d) At 2055 all ships went to General Quarters as enemy aircraft were reported. 2 bombs were dropped on LABUAN ISLAND at 2103 and 1 bomb fell in anchorage area without damage to shipping. At 2230, 3 enemy planes approached from the east. AA fire from ships shot down one plane, primary credit going to LSMs on beach. Army searchlight control was excellent.
 - (e) On the night of 14/15 June, PTs worked south to NIAH RIVER and north to USUKAN BAY. Both patrols were negative.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. SUMMARY.

13. (a) On 15 June minesweeping continued off MIRI-LUTONG area. Mines swept in that area to date total 246 mines. Minefield appears to be a continuous line extending from shoal water west of BARAM POINT in a southeasterly direction, following curve of shore line approximately 9 miles off shore. Heavy loss of sweeping gear necessitated recalling AMs to BRUNEI BAY. 9 YMSs continued to sweep. Channel east of LABUAN was swept for 5 days with negative results and is considered safe for navigation.
- (b) Troops reached KILANIS settlement on BRUNEI-TUTONG Road without enemy contact. On LABUAN, the enemy pocket 1,000 yards west of LABUAN airstrip continued to resist.
- (c) McCALLA and PHILIP bombarded targets in MIRI-LUTONG area. Hits were scored on suspected gun emplacements and targets of opportunity. No return fire was observed.
14. (a) On 16 June, 92 additional mines were swept in the MIRI-LUTONG area making a total of 338 swept to date. Many sets of YMS gear fouled with mines are in the area, but it was considered inadvisable to attempt recovery at this time since such efforts would interfere with sweeping. Progress in sweeping continued slow due to numerous losses of gear and the heavy chain moorings by which the mines are anchored.
- (b) Mopping-up activity continued on LABUAN, and troops advanced to a point halfway to TUTONG along the BRUNEI-TUTONG road.
- (c) Liberty ship, HELENA MODJESKA, ran aground in VICTORIA HARBOR at 0840, but was pulled off by PINTO (ATF-90) at 0947.
- (d) WESTON was reported to be evacuated by the enemy, and 2/32nd Battalion is scheduled to land there on 17 June.
- (e) Captain H. B. HUDSON, USN, was to assume status of administrative SOPA and 7thPhibForRep upon departure of CTG 78.1 on 17 June and exercise operational and administrative control of naval forces, SEVENTH Fleet, present less Task Force 74.
- (f) As of 1800/16 Australian casualties in all sectors were 40 killed and 100/120 wounded. Enemy casualties on LABUAN ISLAND as of 1800/16th were as follows: 205 counted dead; 29 estimated dead; 20 wounded; and 5 POW. Enemy casualties in BRUNEI area as of 1800/15 were as follows: 70 counted dead; 20 estimated dead; and 6 POW.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. SUMMARY.

(g) On 16 June Lieut. General MORSHEAD, GOC, I Australian Corps, who had returned to MOROTAI, sent the following message: "FOR REAR ADMIRAL ROYAL X ON THE EVE OF YOUR DEPARTURE I WISH TO EXPRESS ADMIRATION AND APPRECIATION OF THE THOROUGH EFFICIENT GALLANT AND SUCCESSFUL MANNER IN WHICH THE NAVAL FORCE UNDER YOUR COMMAND CARRIED OUT ITS VITAL ROLE IN BOTH OF THE BORNEO OPERATIONS X THANK YOU FOR ALL YOUR HELP AND COOPERATION X OUR BEST WISHES FOR FURTHER SUCCESSES AND GOOD LUCK TO YOU ALWAYS".

15. At 0930, 17 June, WESTON was captured by an Attack Unit under Commander W. E. VERGE, USN, ComLSMFlotilla 7, carrying the 2/32nd Australian Battalion of the 24th Brigade. Minesweeping in MIRI-LUTONG Area was continued this date. CTG 78.1 (Rear Admiral ROYAL) departed at 1800 in the U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT (AGC-3). Captain H. B. HUDSON, USN, assumed the duties of Senior Officer Present Afloat, Administrative, and SEVENTH Amphibious Force Representative.

B. COMPOSITION OF BRUNEI, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

1. 78.1 BRUNEI Attack Group, Rear Admiral ROYAL
ROCKY MOUNT (Flagship), Captain HARDESTY 1 AGC
2. 74.3 Cruiser Covering Group, Rear Admiral BERKEY
 - 74.3.1 Fire Support Unit ONE
BOISE, HOBART, PHOENIX (BROWN Beach) 3 CL
KILLEN, A.W. GRANT 2 DD
 - 74.3.2 Fire Support Unit TWO
NASHVILLE (GREEN Beach) 1 CL
ARUNTA, CONNER 2 DD
 - 74.3.3 Fire Support Unit THREE
CHARRETTE, BELL, BURNS (WHITE Beach) 3 DD
3. 70.1 Motor Torpedo Boat Group, Captain BOWLING
Forces Assigned
 - 70.1.7 Motor Torpedo Boat Unit
WILLOUGHBY 1 AGP
MTB Ron 13 12 MTB

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF BRUNEI, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

4. 78.1.1 Transport and Landing Craft Unit, Captain HUDSON

78.1.11 Transport Unit, Captain COUSIN

MANOORA (F), WESTRALIA, KANIMBLA	3 LSI
TITANIA	1 AKA
CARTER HALL	1 LSD

Transport Division 103, Commander PARSONS

LLOYD, KEPHART, DIACHENKO, NEWMAN, LIDDIE	5 APD
---	-------

78.1.12 LST Unit, Captain HUDSON

LST Flotilla 24, Captain HUDSON

LST 640 (FF), 560, 591, 595, 619 (H), 638, 696, 806, 912 (H), 936, 937, 941, 942	13 LST
---	--------

LST Flotilla 15, Captain MANEES

LST 574 (FF), 573, 709, 751, 922, 626, 1025 (H), 1027	8 LST
--	-------

From LST Flotilla 22

LST 584, 585, 590, 637, 1035	5 LST
------------------------------	-------

LST Flotilla 8, Captain WATTS

LST 614 (FF), 562, 742, 667 (H), 697, 613 (H), 743, 993	8 LST
--	-------

78.1.13 LCI Unit, Captain MARTIN

LCI 546 (FF)	1 LCI
--------------	-------

LCI 744 (GF), 745, 746, 749, 544, 577, 661, 662, 753, 955, 958, 960 (GF), 1019, 1060, 636 (GF), 701, 702, 703, 713, 1074, 1075	21 LCI
--	--------

78.1.14 LSM Unit, Commander VERGE

LSM Flotilla 7, Commander VERGE

LSM 54 (FF), 50, 51, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 128, 133, 138, 139, 168, (GF), 203, 219, 225, 237, 269.	20 LSM
--	--------

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF BRUNEI, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

78.1.15 LCT Unit, Lieutenant DeMOSS

LCT 1310, 1312, 1314, 1317 (GF), 1319, 1331 6 LCT

78.1.16 BROWN Assault Unit, Captain HUDSON

LST 640 (FF)(P), 560 (P), 591 (P), 595 (P), 17 LST
619 (H)(P), 696 (#)(P), 709 (#)(P), 638 (B),
941 (B), 806, 912 (H), 936, 937, 585, 942,
637, 1025 (H)

MANOORA, WESTRALIA 2 LSI
CARTER HALL 1 LSD
TITANIA 1 AKA

LSM 128, 50, 51, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65 8 LSM

LCI 744 (GF), 745, 746, 749, 955 5 LCI

78.1.17 GREEN Assault Unit, Captain MANEES

SPENCER (F) 1 CGC
KANIMBLA 1 LSI

½ LST 574 (FF)(#) 1 LST

* LSM 237 1 LSM

(*)-LSM 237 lands at GREEN or RED Beach as
directed by CTU 78.1.17

78.1.18 WHITE Assault Unit, Captain MANEES

SPENCER (F) 1 CGC
½ LST 574 (#) 1 LST

LST 751 (GF), 667 (#)(H), 584, 922 (B) 4 LST

LLOYD (F), NEWMAN, LIDDLE, KEPHART, DIACHENKO 5 APD

LCI 636 (GF), 701, 702, 703 4 LCI

LSM 168 (GF), 203, 219, 225, 138, 67, 68 7 LSM

(B) - Pontoon Barges
(H) - Hospital Ship

(#) - 6 Davit
(%) - Takes station as
directed by
CTU 78.1.17.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF BRUNEI, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

78.1.19 Reinforcement Unit, Captain WATTS

LST 626, 613, 697 (#), 742, 743, 993, 590, 1027, 1035, 614 (FF) 10 LST

LCI 960 (GF), 1019, 1060, 753, 544, 577, 661, 662 8 LCI

78.1.20 Reserve Unit, Commander VERGE

LST 573 (#), 562 (#) 2 LST

LSM 269, 133, 139, 54 (FF) 4 LSM

LCI 713, 958, 1074, 1075 4 LCI

5. 78.1.2 Screen, Captain SMITH

WALLER (FD), SAUFLEY, PHILIP (FD), ROBINSON (SF), BANCROFT (DF)(FD), BAILEY (DF)(FD), EDWARDS, CALDWELL, FRAZIER (SF), McCALLA 10 DD

DOUGLAS A. MUNRO (DF), CHARLES E. BRANNON, ALBERT T. HARRIS, DUFILHO, JOBB, DAY 6 DE

HMAS HAWKESBURY, HMAS BARCOO 2 PF

78.1.21 Destroyer Unit, Captain SMITH

WALLER (FD), SAUFLEY, PHILIP (FD), ROBINSON (SF), BANCROFT (DF)(FD), EDWARDS, McCALLA, CALDWELL, BAILEY (DF)(FD), FRAZIER (SF) 10 DD

78.1.22 Destroyer Escort Unit,

DOUGLAS A. MUNRO (DF), CHARLES E. BRANNON, ALBERT T. HARRIS, DUFILHO, JOBB, DAY 6 DE

78.1.23 Frigate Unit, Lt. Comdr. WESTON, RANR

HMAS HAWKESBURY, HMAS BARCOO 2 PF

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF BRUNEI, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

6. 78.1.3 Support Unit, Captain ARISON

LCI(L) 778 (F) 1 LCI(L)

78.1.31 LCS Unit, Captain ARISON

LCS(L) 42, 45, 46, 47, 58, 59, 60 7 LCS(L)

78.1.32 LCI(G) Unit, Lt. Comdr. HOLMES

LCI(G) 69 (GF), 23, 64, 65, 68, 70 6 LCI(G)

78.1.33 LCI(R) Unit, Lt. Comdr. SARGENT

LCI(R) 71 (GF), 31, 34, 72, 74, 338 6 LCI(R)

78.1.34 LCI(M) Unit, Lieut.(jg) PETERSON

LCI(M) 359, 362 (F), 431 3 LCI(M)

78.1.35 Demolition Unit, Lieutenant BURNS

KLINE (APD 120) - UDT#11 1 APD
LCI(D) 29 (F), 228 2 LCI(D)

NCDU 20, NCDU 2 (F), NCDU 24, NCDU 3
(Lt. KAINE) 4 NCDU

78.1.36 BROWN Support Unit, Lt. Comdr. HOLMES

LCS(L) 58, 59, 60 3 LCS(L)
LCI(S) 1000, 1071 2 LCI(S)
LCI(R) 31, 34 2 LCI(R)
LCI(G) 69 (F), 70 2 LCI(G)
LCI(M) 359, 362 2 LCI(M)
LCI(D) 29 1 LCI(D)
NCDU 20, NCDU 24 2 NCDU

78.1.37 GREEN Support Unit, Captain ARISON

LCI(L) 778 (F) 1 LCI(L)
LCS(L) 42, 47 2 LCS(L)
LCI(G) 65, 68 2 LCI(G)
LCI(R) 74, 338 2 LCI(R)
LCI(S) 961 1 LCI(S)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF BRUNEI, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

78.1.38 WHITE Support Unit, Lt. Comdr. SARGENT

LCS(L) 45, 46	2 LCS(L)
LCI(S) 985	1 LCI(S)
LCI(G) 23, 64	2 LCI(G)
LCI(R) 71 (GF), 72	2 LCI(R)
LCI(M) 431	1 LCI(M)
LCI(D) 228	1 LCI(D)
NCDU 2, NCDU 3	2 NCDU

7. 78.1.4 Landing Craft Control Unit, Lieutenant GOODRICH

PC 1120, 1122	2 PC
SC 698, 732, 741, 750	4 SC

78.1.41 Control Unit BROWN, Lieutenant DEVANEY

PC 1120	1 PC
SC 698, 732	2 SC

78.1.42 Control Unit GREEN*, Captain ARISON

SC 750, 741	2 SC
-------------	------

78.1.43 Control Unit WHITE*, Captain MARTIN

PC 1122	1 PC
*LCI(L) 546	1 LCI(L)

(*) - For assault only.

8. 78.1.5 Minesweeping Unit, Lt. Comdr. FONICK

MinDiv 34
SENTRY (F), SALUTE, SCOUT, SCRIMMAGE, SCUFFLE 5 AM

YMS Unit
COFER (F) 1 APD
LSM 1 (tender) 1 LSM
YMS 4, 6, 39, 51, 68, 73, 313, 314, 259, 340, 12 YMS
363, 365
4 LCVPs 4 LCVP
2 MLs 2 ML

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF BRUNEI, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

78.1.50 YMS Unit

1 APD	1 APD
12 YMSs	12 YMS
4 LCVPs	4 LCVP
2 MLs	2 ML

78.1.51 Sweep Unit ONE, Lt. Comdr. FONICK

5 AMSs	5 AMS
--------	-------

78.1.52 Sweep Unit TWO

4 YMSs as assigned	4 YMS
--------------------	-------

78.1.53 Sweep Unit THREE

4 YMSs as assigned	4 YMS
--------------------	-------

78.1.54 Sweep Unit FOUR

4 YMSs as assigned	4 YMS
--------------------	-------

78.1.55 Sweep Unit FIVE

1 APD	1 APD
4 LCVPs	4 LCVP
2 MLs	2 ML

9. 78.1.6 Hydrographic Survey Unit, Lt. Comdr. TANCRED, RAN

HEMAS LACHLAN	1 AGS
SATINLEAF	1 AN
YMS 160	1 YMS

10. 78.1.7 Salvage and Service Unit

78.1.71 Salvage Unit

PINTO (F)	1 ATF
ATR 61	1 ATR

78.1.72 Fire Fighting Unit

LCI(S) 961, 985, 1000, 1071	4 LCI(S)
-----------------------------	----------

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF BRUNEI, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

78.1.73 Service Unit

WINOOSKI	1 AO
ACHILLES	1 ARL
LST 473	1 LST

78.1.74 Press Unit

PCE(R) 849	1 PCE(R)
LCI(L) 635	1 LCI(L)
FP 47	1 FP

11. 78.1.8 Beachmaster Unit, Lt. Comdr. McKAUGE, RANVR

78.1.81 BROWN Beach Party, Lt. Comdr. McKAUGE, RANVR

Beach Party 4, NBC "B", RAN

78.1.82 GREEN Beach Party, Sub. Lieut. ATCHISON, RANR

Beach Party 5, NBC "B", RAN

78.1.83 WHITE Beach Party, Sub. Lieut. WILLSALLIN, RANR

Beach Party 6, NBC "B", RAN

78.1.84 YELLOW Beach Party, Lieutenant RICHARDS, RANR

Beach Party 7, NBC "B", RAN

78.1.85 Beach Party No. 10, Lieutenant MEYERS

12. 78.1.91
to Resupply and Returning Convoys
78.1.99

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.

1. The operation for the capture of BRUNET BAY was planned and mounted at MOROTAI. It was one of a series of operations directed at the re-occupation of BORNEO.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.

2. Vice Admiral Daniel E. BARBEY, U.S. Navy, Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, was the Task Force Commander for all of the BORNEO operations. Rear Admiral Forrest B. ROYAL, Commander Amphibious Group SIX, commanded the amphibious forces involved in the BRUNEI BAY operation and was the Naval commander in direct command of the operation. The Landing Force, composed of the 20th and 24th Australian Brigade Groups of the 9th Australian Division, was commanded by Major General G. F. WOOTTEN, AIF, who was under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Leslie MORSHEAD, General Officer Commanding, I Australian Corps. Air Vice Marshal BOSTOCK, RAAF, commanded the allied air forces involved. Rear Admiral Russell BERKEY commanded the Cruiser Covering Force which supported the operation and provided naval gunfire to cover the landings.
3. Planning for the operation commenced at MOROTAI on 2 May 1945. Immediately after the landing at TARAKAN, on 1 May 1945, Commander R. L. LAMPMAN, U.S. Navy, Planning Officer on the staff of Commander Amphibious Group SIX, flew from TARAKAN to MOROTAI. He was followed the next day by Captain Hamilton HAINS, U.S. Navy, the Operations Officer. Intimate liaison was maintained between the staffs of the Naval and Army Commanders throughout the planning stage.
4. The operation was originally planned for a ZEBRA Day of 23 May. Certain elements of the 9th Australian Division were not ready at the staging area when planning began, and it soon became evident that they would not arrive until at least a week too late to permit meeting the projected date. Meanwhile, loading and training schedule and loading plans had been formulated. The inability to assemble all of the troops, equipment and supplies which it was desired to take forward by the date initially specified made it necessary to delay the entire operation. This delay entailed radical changes in the loading and movement plans, which changes were made without too much difficulty. In view of the fact that a delay of 17 days had become necessary, and in order not to hold shipping idle for that long a period, as much shipping as practicable was released to Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force and was later replaced by similar shipping which became available upon completion of the re-supply echelons to TARAKAN. Much of the loading was accomplished in increments. Such equipment and stores as were available were loaded as early as possible even though in some cases this necessitated its remaining for several weeks in the ships. This eased the loading situation at the end of the loading period. The loading facilities at MOROTAI are very limited and had this piecemeal loading not been undertaken, there might have been considerable difficulty in meeting the scheduled date.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.

5. It became apparent at the start that this operation would involve so many of the qualities of a very large landing, all on a reduced scale, that it would be necessary to greatly divide responsibility and delegate authority to several junior commanders. Six landing beaches were selected, which would accommodate various types of landing craft. After careful study of the hydrographic features of the beaches and the capabilities of the landing craft available, final decision was made to land initially on three of the selected beaches. The landing beaches selected were: (1) BROWN Beach on LABUAN ISLAND, extending from VICTORIA TOWN to RAMSAY POINT, a distance of about 1200 yards; (2) WHITE Beach on MUARA ISLAND, extending from SAPO POINT approximately 1000 yards to the northward; and (3) GREEN Beach, lying about one mile to the eastward of BRUNEI BLUFF and extending approximately 500 yards. The landings on BROWN and WHITE Beaches were to be made using LVTs and that on GREEN Beach with LCVPs.
6. Since BROWN Beach is nearly 20 miles from WHITE and GREEN Beaches, it was decided to have two separate Assault Units and have the Attack Group Commander exercise over-all control while permitting the Assault Unit Commanders to conduct the landings in their respective areas. It also necessitated a division of control of Support Air and Naval Gunfire. Fighter Direction throughout the entire area was retained in one ship. NASHVILLE controlled Air Support and Naval Gunfire in the southern sector and ROCKY MOUNT controlled them in the northern area. It was planned initially that ROCKY MOUNT would control Fighter Direction, but a casualty to her air search radar shortly before departing MOROTAI made it necessary to assign that control to another ship. SPENCER was designated. This division of control was quite satisfactory and no serious difficulties were encountered.
7. The landings on BROWN and GREEN Beaches were normal landings with no unusual features involved. At BROWN Beach the support craft made a preliminary run firing rockets, about one hour before the landing, and a second run while leading in the first assault wave. At GREEN Beach the only run made by the support craft was the one made while leading the assault waves to the beach. The locations of shoals and channels in the vicinity of WHITE Beach made it impossible to conduct the landing in a normal manner. Extending out from the beach for a distance of approximately 2000 yards there was a long flat under-water shelf over which the depth of water varied from about twelve feet to two feet, hence it was impossible to have the support craft lead the first assault wave to the beach. To the southward of MUARA ISLAND there is a fairly deep water channel. It has sufficient width to permit passage of the support craft in formation for their rocket and gunfire bombardment.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.

7. (continued)

Directly west of SAPO POINT, lying at approximately right angles to WHITE Beach and extending for a distance of about 1000 yards, there is an area containing several piers. This area was designated RED Beach and its extreme right flank approximately joined the extreme left flank of WHITE Beach. In order to make possible a rocket and gunfire barrage from the support craft it was necessary to have the support craft make their run at right angles to the boat lane and expend their barrage down the length of WHITE Beach. In effect, this amounted to laying their barrage behind RED Beach. The naval gunfire support ships covering the WHITE Beach landing had to take station approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the north of the landing beach. These enforced geographical positions imposed the necessity for a very accurate timing of all the events leading up to the landing, since the naval gunfire was coming from the north, the support craft were firing from the south, and the assault waves were approaching from the east. Also, it was believed that with normal wind conditions the smoke and dust from the landing beaches would very nearly obscure the positions of the leading waves when they neared the beach. It was not possible for the guide craft in the LCI or LCVP to approach closer than about 500 yards before they grounded, and the LVT waves had to proceed through that final stretch unescorted. In view of the fact that the only other suitable landing area in the vicinity was RED Beach, and since that beach was rather effectively blocked by piers and fish traps, it was decided to accept the difficulties of timing and land on WHITE Beach.

8. The amount of naval gunfire provided was adequate for the destruction of any possible enemy installations. Intelligence did not indicate that the enemy had constructed any material beach defenses, nor was there any indication that he intended to defend his beach. There was no information which would suggest the erection of beach obstacles. The only rumor which indicated the possibility of mines was derived from one native whose credibility was questionable. He stated that the Japs had a barbed wire fence about 200 yards inshore of BROWN Beach and that no one was permitted to go outside of that fence. Subsequent investigations by the Underwater Demolition Teams proved the indications given by this informant were misinterpreted; there were no mines, there was no fence, and there were no obstacles. While it may appear that with no beach defenses the amount of ammunition expended was excessive, it is not so considered because it effectively prevented any opposition being met until the assault troops were well inland. The only casualties sustained by the assault troops in this landing were those accidentally inflicted by own forces.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.

9. Immediately after the timed waves had landed, the "on call" waves, carrying equipment and supplies were beached and general unloading was commenced immediately. The beach conditions were approximately as had been expected, and no untoward difficulties were encountered. The first group of ships to be unloaded were delayed 24 hours beyond the planned sailing time due primarily to the strong desire not to commit causeways for unloading LSTs. It was believed that the 24-hour delay was acceptable, since by accepting it, it was unnecessary to launch causeways which were vitally needed in other areas.
10. Each of the two brigades to be landed in this operation were composed of three infantry battalions and one cavalry commando squadron. The third brigade of the division had already been committed at TARAKAN, hence no division reserve was immediately available to the landing force commander. In order to provide a division reserve, one infantry battalion of the 24th Brigade, elements of the Cavalry Commando Squadron of the 20th Brigade, together with a small unit of tanks, artillery and a light AA section, were held out. Since the probable landing places for the division reserve were numerous and included all of the six originally designated color beaches and several other contingent localities in the area, it was necessary to handle this reserve as a separate task unit. The reserve was loaded into the shipping of the reserve unit in such a manner that it could be landed behind either of the two assault brigades or it could be landed in assault on other beaches. Plans for landing under either condition were prepared by the Reserve Unit Commander. Actually the reserve was not committed until ZEBRA plus SEVEN Day, at which time the infantry battalion was landed at WESTON, seven miles up the PADAS RIVER.
11. The difficulties imposed by the complicated timing necessarily indicated the desirability for extensive rehearsal. The various units involved in the operation undertook to conduct separate training exercises, utilizing all the facilities which would be available at the objective in order to insure their complete and proper functioning. Support Air conducted a very thorough communication drill with air-borne planes and air observers, and with the support air teams manning all of their stations in the command ship. These exercises were continued until Commander Support Air was satisfied that all concerned understood their jobs and were thoroughly capable of performing them. Similarly, communication exercises with the beachmaster teams, the control craft, support craft, fire support liaison and observation communication sections were conducted prior to the main rehearsals. Over a period of about five days the support craft were exercised daily in the performance of their functions in order to perfect their timing and coordination. That these exercises paid for themselves is well recognized since

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.

11. (continued)

the timing and coordination at the objective was well-nigh perfect. The MOROTAI area does not lend itself well to conducting an amphibious rehearsal, since there are no beaches which are not blocked off-shore by continuous coral reefs, and there are few areas shallow enough to permit the anchoring of the control craft or the ships in the transport area. It was necessary, therefore, to establish simulated beaches in the vicinity of islands in the harbor anchorage. The Port Director, MOROTAI, was very helpful and cooperative in clearing shipping from areas required for exercises. These beaches were indicated by a line of buoys. The exercises on WHITE and GREEN Beach were conducted on 31 May, and numerous deficiencies were noted in the manner of execution. The exercises were re-run the same day several times with the result that at the completion of the last exercises satisfactory performance had been obtained. The rehearsal for BROWN Beach was conducted the following day, 1 June, and again numerous difficulties and insufficiencies were noted which necessitated the re-running of the primary assault waves.

12. Throughout the loading and planning period all ships attached to the Task Group were given opportunity to conduct anti-aircraft training, and the destroyers of the screen, in addition, were given opportunity to conduct tactical exercises and surface firing practices.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

(All times are Minus NINE (ITEM) Zone)
(All dates are east longitude date)

9 June 1945 - ZEBRA minus ONE Day.

Clear until sunrise with cirrus then forming and increasing to broken by early afternoon and remaining broken to overcast for remainder of period. Scattered cumulus in afternoon. Wind moderate southeasterly becoming gentle variable by sunrise, gentle northwesterly by noon. Sea smooth with little or no swell. Visibility unrestricted.

Cruiser Covering Group and Minesweeping Unit of TG 78.1 were already present at BRUNEI BAY conducting operations.

- 0001 - CTG 78.1 underway in U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) with main assault echelon in cruising disposition 6-CS, course 246° T, speed seven knots in position 07°33.5' North Latitude, 116°37' East Longitude.
- 0600 - Changed fleet course and axis to 223° T.
- 0705 - WILLOUGHBY (AGP 9) left station to aid broken-down PT boat.
- 0750 - Four PT boats detached from formation and sent on ahead to commence operations at objective.
- 0805 - Fleet course and axis changed to 220° T and speed increased to 7.5 knots.
- 0900 - HMAS BARCOO, 6 LCTs, and 44 LCMs departed BALABAC ISLAND.
- 1055 - WILLOUGHBY (AGP 9) rejoined formation.
- 1400 - Fleet course and axis changed to 215° T and speed increased to 8 knots.
- 1420 - BOISE (CL 47) with General Douglas MacARTHUR (CinC SWPA) aboard, escorted by the KILLEN (DD 593) and GRANT (DD 649), joined the formation and took position astern.
- 1425 - KILLEN (DD 593) and GRANT (DD 649) fueled from WINOOSKI.
- 1500 - PT patrols began at the objective area with negative results.
- 1630 - Signal to form the Approach Formation was executed.
- 1830 - ALBERT T. HARRIS (DE 447) transferred a radar technician from the ROCKY MOUNT to the LST 640 by breeches buoy to repair the latter's radar.
- 2105 - Fleet course and axis changed to 190° T.
- 2120 - Contact established with TG 74.3 by radio.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

9 June 1945 - ZEBRA minus ONE Day. (continued)

2130 - Fleet course and axis changed to 171° T.

2130 - CTG 74.3 reported 35 more mines had been swept at the objective, making a total of 69 to date. Hydrographic work had continued successfully with the planting of the remainder of the navigational buoys. UDT 11 finished reconnaissance and survey of all the Beaches.

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day.

High overcast. Scattered cumulus during the day with scattered showers over nearby land in the afternoon. Wind light variable. Sea smooth. Visibility unrestricted.

0052 - Fleet course and axis changed to 128° T.

0115 - Speed was slowed to six knots.

0215 - Interval was closed to 500 yards.

0247 - Fleet course and axis changed to 125° T.

0258 - Fleet course and axis changed to 120° T.

0317 - Speed was increased to eight knots.

0425 - Signal was executed to "DEPLOY". Assault Unit Commanders took charge of their units and proceeded as previously directed. LST 473 and WINOOSKI (AO 38) proceeded to assigned anchorages in Area ZEBRA. Reserve Unit (TU 78.1.20) proceeded to assigned anchorages in Anchorage Area SUGAR. ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3), ACHILLES (ARL 41), FP 47, PCE(R) 849, LCI 635, and PINTO (ATF 90) proceeded to assigned berths in Transport Area SUGAR and LST Area FIVE. PINTO (ATF 90) reported to CTU 78.1.16 and ATR 61 reported to CTU 78.1.18. The PHILIP (DD 498) was left at Point DENVER to serve as radar picket.

0540 - Fleet course and axis changed to 089° T.

0545 - Fleet course and axis changed to 347° T.

0550 - Fleet course and axis changed to 332° T.

0554 - ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) anchored in Berth FIVE, Transport Area SUGAR. Only the assault landing on BROWN Beach could be witnessed visually by CTG 78.1. Information on GREEN and WHITE Beaches was received by dispatch.

0618 - CTU 78.1.16 ordered the BROWN Assault Unit to take assigned stations in LST Transport Area FIVE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day (continued).

- 0618 - MANOORA, TITANIA, and WESTRALIA were observed to be on station in Transport Area SUGAR in the dim morning light.
- 0620 - Boat left flagship with Control Officers for PC 1120.
- 0635 - Two P-61s ordered on station as dawn patrol.
- 0650 - The hulk of a Japanese freighter was observed off BROWN Beach.
- 0651 - Enemy plane on course 350° came over transport area and dropped bomb, but no damage or casualties were observed. The bomb was dropped between TITANIA and an LST about 500 yards from the Attack Group flagship. Plane was a Japanese twin-engined NICK.
- 0652 - Flash RED, control GREEN.
- 0655 - Bogey on course 020°, 17 miles. CAP sent to intercept.
- 0656 - Bogey bearing 245°, 15 miles.
- 0658 - Bogey bearing 250°, 24 miles.
- 0700 - At first light, all ships making assault landing on BROWN Beach were observed anchored on proper stations in transport area except LCI(M) 362 which had been detached at ZAMBOANGA from the echelon for repairs and LCI(D) 228 which had never sailed from MOROTAI because of damaged propellers.
- 0705 - Sunrise.
- 0707 - Bogey opened, on course 245°, 35 miles distant.
- 0708 - MANOORA lowered boats, troops were boated, and boats stood by.
- 0709 - Bogey reported by SPENCER (CGC 36) on course 340° over LABUAN ISLAND.
- 0710 - A second bogey reported by MANOORA on course 140°.
- 0712 - Bogey reported bearing 355°, 15 miles distant, closing.
- 0719 - SCs 732 and 698 and PC 1120 were observed moving up to Line of Departure.
- 0727 - Support craft observed moving up to Line of Departure.
- 0729 - Line of Departure established for GREEN and WHITE Beaches.
- 0730 - SPENCER (CGC 36) reported a two-engine bomber, 18 miles distant, bearing 265°.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day (continued).

- 0730 - CARTER HALL (LSD 3) started launching LCMs in LST Area FIVE.
- 0731 - CAP vectored to intercept bogey.
- 0733 - Line of Departure established for BROWN Beach.
- 0736 - Support craft were observed on station, forward of Line of Departure.
- 0739 - LST 585 started launching LVTs.
- 0742 - LSTs 640, 637, and 1025 started launching LVTs.
- 0745 - FC 1120 made time check.
- 0747 - CTU 78.1.17 confirmed ability to meet JIG and HON Hours.
- 0749 - BOISE (CL 47) reported on station in Area MIKE.
- 0750 - Order was given by CTU 78.1.18 to Land the Landing Force on WHITE and GREEN Beaches.
- 0750 - CARTER HALL (LSD 3) under way from LST Transport Area FIVE off BROWN Beach for WHITE Beach to launch her three remaining LCMs off that Beach.
- 0759 - Flash WHITE, control GREEN.
- 0800 - Support craft started first run on BROWN Beach.
- 0805 - Naval gunfire commenced.
- 0807 - Support craft opened fire on BROWN Beach.
- 0810 - CTU 78.1.16 confirmed ability to meet DOG Hour of 0915 on BROWN Beach.
- 0812 - LCSs, having completed their run, retracted from BROWN Beach.
- 0815 - Fourteen B-24s approached the target area.
- 0817 - Bogey reported bearing 220°, 25 miles distant. CAP sent out to investigate.
- 0817 - Flash BLUE, control GREEN.
- 0817 - All landing craft for the assault on WHITE Beach had been launched.
- 0818 - Bogey reported by SPENCER (CGC 36) bearing 250°, 20 miles from Point SARAH.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day (continued).

- 0822 - PBY plane landed near ROCKY MOUNT. Boat sent out to meet it.
- 0824 - Bogey reported by CIC at 25 miles. CAF sent out to investigate.
- 0830 - CTU 78.1.18 reported that the support craft had completed their first run on WHITE Beach.
- 0830 - Bogey reported at 0824 was "splashed". Flash WHITE, control GREEN.
- 0840 - Lieutenant General MORSHEAD, General Officer Commanding, 1st Australian Corps, and Air Vice Marshal BOSTOCK of the RAAF came aboard.
- 0840 - CTU 78.1.17 reported landing craft on station off GREEN Beach.
- 0840 - BROWN TWO waves were ordered back from the Line of Departure.
- 0841 - CTU 78.1.41 reported support craft on station for second run on BROWN Beach.
- 0845 - First wave was dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 0846 - Fourteen B-24s made a strike on BROWN Beach.
- 0848 - Second wave dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 0850 - CSF reported three squadrons of B-24s made a strike in Area CHARLIE and one squadron of B-24s made a strike in Area BAKER on HAMILTON POINT.
- 0851 - Third wave dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 0854 - Fourth wave dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 0855 - Japanese opened fire on our beachhead from the beached hulk of the Japanese freighter.
- 0856 - First wave dispatched to WHITE Beach.
- 0859 - LCIs of seventh wave closed the Line of Departure.
- 0859 - Second wave dispatched to WHITE Beach.
- 0900 - Bomb strike made in Area CHARLIE.
- 0900 - Secured from General Quarters.
- 0904 - A rocket barrage laid by LCI(R) support craft.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day (Continued).

- 0905 - Third wave dispatched to WHITE Beach.
- 0906 - Aircraft dropped white flares, signifying first wave was 500 yards from BROWN Beach.
- 0906 - First wave was dispatched to GREEN Beach.
- 0907 - LCIs shot red smoke signals, signifying first waves were 500 yards from BROWN Beach. Naval gunfire was shifted inland.
- 0909 - Second wave dispatched to GREEN Beach.
- 0912 - Fifth wave dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 0912 - Third wave dispatched to GREEN Beach.
- 0914 - LVTs of first wave landed on BROWN ONE Beach.
- 0915 - First wave landed on GREEN Beach on schedule.
- 0915 - Bomb strike made in Area CHARLIE, behind beach on LABUAN ISLAND.
- 0915:35 - LVTs of first wave landed on BROWN TWO Beach.
- 0916 - First wave landed on WHITE Beach, one minute late.
- 0917 - Second wave landed on BROWN Beach.
- 0917 - Fourth wave dispatched to GREEN Beach.
- 0917:20 - Second wave landed on BROWN TWO Beach.
- 0918 - A "FRANCIS" was reported bearing 240° T, distance 8 miles. Flash RED, control GREEN.
- 0918 - Sixth wave dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 0918 - Second wave landed on WHITE Beach.
- 0918 - Second wave landed on GREEN Beach.
- 0919 - Third wave landed on BROWN ONE Beach.
- 0920 - Third wave landed on BROWN TWO Beach.
- 0921 - Fourth wave landed on BROWN ONE Beach.
- 0921 - Third wave landed on GREEN Beach.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day (continued).

- 0922 - Flash BLUE, control GREEN.
- 0924 - Wave three landed on WHITE Beach.
- 0924 - Fourth wave landed on BROWN TWO Beach.
- 0925 - LCI 955 and LCI 749 were ordered to remain on station until further notice.
- 0926:30 - Fifth wave landed on BROWN TWO Beach.
- 0927 - Fifth wave landed on BROWN ONE Beach.
- 0928 - All LVTs but one landed on WHITE Beach.
- 0930 - Bomb strike reported in Area CHARLIE.
- 0930 - LST Beaching Officer landed on BROWN Beach and reported no incidents and that hydrographic survey was being made.
- 0930 - Commanding Officer of 20th Brigade reported that WHITE Beach was captured with no opposition.
- 0932 - Fourth wave landed on GREEN Beach.
- 0932 - All waves had been landed on WHITE Beach and it was reported captured.
- 0933 - Sixth wave landed on BROWN ONE Beach.
- 0933:30 - Sixth wave landed on BROWN TWO Beach.
- 0937 - Secured from General Quarters. Flash BLUE, control GREEN.
- 0940 - Seventh wave dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 0940 - LCI 749 beached in slot 10 on BROWN Beach TWO. LCI 955 beached in slot 1 on BROWN Beach ONE.
- 0946 - CTU 78.1.16 directed control officer to send eighth wave to BROWN Beach.
- 0950 - Eighth wave dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 0953 - Seventh wave of LCI(L)s 749 and 965 landed on BROWN Beach.
- 0955 - Bomb strike in Area CHARLIE.
- 1000 - LSM 237 beached on GREEN Beach in assigned slot.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day (continued)

- 1001 - First four waves on BROWN Beach directed to secure and return to ships.
- 1003 - GREEN Beach was reported captured.
- 1004 - LCI 749 unloaded on BROWN Beach TWO.
- 1004 - Eighth wave landed on BROWN Beach.
- 1005 - LCI 749 retracted from BROWN Beach TWO.
- 1010 - All troops have landed on GREEN Beach without opposition. Beach conditions were reported to be excellent.
- 1028 - LCI 955 finished unloading on BROWN TWO Beach.
- 1043 - Ninth wave dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 1047 - LCS 58 was directed to withdraw seaward of LST 359 off BROWN Beach.
- 1048 - Eleventh Wave dispatched to BROWN Beach (The tenth wave of LCI(L)s was on call).
- 1052 - Admiral ROYAL accompanied by Lt. General MORSHEAD and Air Vice Marshal BOSTOCK left flagship for BOISE (CL 47).
- 1053 - Twelfth wave dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 1055 - CAP of six Beaufighters relieved by three P-38s.
- 1058 - Ninth wave landed on BROWN ONE Beach.
- 1059 - Ninth wave landed on BROWN TWO Beach.
- 1100 - Anti-submarine plane (HOMEBARD 61) went on patrol.
- 1101 - Eleventh wave landed on BROWN ONE.
- 1103 - Eleventh wave landed on BROWN TWO.
- 1104 - Brigadier PORTER assumed command of his troops ashore (24th Brigade), on LABUAN ISLAND.
- 1106 - Twelfth wave landed on BROWN ONE and TWO.
- 1110 - General of the Army MacARTHUR, CinC SWPA, embarked in an LCVP with Admiral ROYAL, Lt. General MORSHEAD, and General KENNEY and went in to inspect LABUAN ISLAND beaches. They were escorted by two PTs.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day (continued).

- 1130 - LSMs 50 and 65 observed on BROWN Beach ONE. LSMs 53 and 64 observed on beach about on line dividing BROWN ONE and TWO Beaches.
- 1134 - Flash WHITE, control GREEN.
- 1141 - PBM (RAN) reported that the left-hand extremity of BROWN ONE Beach was unsatisfactory for LSMs.
- 1155 - Rear Admiral ROYAL returned on board ROCKY MOUNT.
- 1200 - The following LSMs were on BROWN Beach: 52, 53, 63, and 64.
- 1207 - LSM 52 retracted.
- 1215 - Six Beaufighters dropped bombs on PAPAR BRIDGE near JESSELTON.
- 1220 - CTU 78.1.17 reported landing of YELLOW reserves in 5 waves on GREEN Beach completed.
- 1225 - Line of Departure for GREEN and WHITE Beaches was dissolved by CTU 78.1.17.
- 1230 - CARTER HALL (LSD 3) returned from WHITE Beach to Transport Area SUGAR.
- 1231 - LSM 52 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1232 - LSM 64 retracted from BROWN Beach.
- 1241 - DOUGLAS A. MUNRO (DE 422) located wreck of SALUTE (AM 294) which sunk at 082300 after hitting Japanese contact mine the afternoon of that day.
- 1241 - LSM 53 retracted from BROWN Beach.
- 1250 - LSM 65 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1251 - LSM 51 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1300 - MANOORA, WESTRALIA, TITANIA ordered to close beach in order to expedite unloading.
- 1305 - LSMs 65, 52, 63, and 51 retracted from BROWN Beach.
- 1315 - LSM 65 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1315 - Twelve DUKWs at Line of Departure, awaiting orders to go to BROWN Beach.
- 1317 - LSM 51 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1322 - CAP was relieved by four P-38s.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 July 1945 - ZEBRA Day (continued).

- 1330 - Captain P. F. DUGAN, Chief of Staff, left flagship for tour of inspection of beaches.
- 1331 - Lieutenant General MORSHEAD, GOC, 1st Australian Corps, and Air Vice Marshal BCSTOCK, AOC RAAF, came aboard ROCKY MOUNT after inspecting beaches with General of the Army MacARTHUR, who returned to the BOISE.
- 1334 - LSM 50 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1336 - LSM 128 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1345 - First wave of twelve DUKWs dispatched to BROWN Beach.
- 1400 - Line of Departure for BROWN Beach was dissolved. SCs were ordered to report to Screen Commander and PC 1120 was ordered to close beach to control small boat traffic.
- 1405 - A press party from MANILA arrived aboard the ROCKY MOUNT.
- 1421 - LSM 65 retracted from BROWN Beach.
- 1427 - LST 640 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1445 - The DUKW wave landed on BROWN Beach to help in unloading LSMs.
- 1450 - PHILIP (DD 498) was relieved by CALDWELL (DD 605) at Point DENVER as radar picket ship and proceeded to station at X-22.
- 1458 - LST 560 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1508 - Availability was given to LCI 985 to repair leak in gear box.
- 1522 - LST 591 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1525 - LSTs 638 and 941 launched pontoon barges.
- 1530 - LST 619 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1532 - LST 595 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1545 - Commander 20th Australian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier WINDEYER, assumed command of his troops ashore, WHITE, GREEN, and YELLOW Beaches.
- 1606 - LST 1025 beached on BROWN Beach.
- 1610 - CTU 78.1.37 in LCI 778 reported back to CTG 78.1 with his Unit in compliance with orders from CTG 74.3. Duties on GREEN Beach were completed.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day (continued).

1633 - LST 637 beached.

1640 - Captain Paul F. DUGAN, Chief of Staff, returned from tour of inspection of beachhead. Visits were made to Beach Group Commander, Headquarters Beach Party No. 10, 24th Brigade Headquarters (Brigadier PORTER), Captain HUDSON (CTU 78.1.1), and Principal Beachmaster. He reported on beach conditions to the Admiral.

1700 - Major General WOOTTEN, GOC, 9th Aust Div, and his Staff disembarked from the ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) to set up headquarters ashore.

1700 - LST 709 beached on BROWN Beach.

1705 - LST 941 beached on BROWN Beach.

1708 - LST 585 beached on BROWN Beach.

1715 - LCS support craft supported troop movement west of VICTORIA TOWN.

1724 - A landing was made on HAMILTON PENINSULA by 2/11th Cavalry Commando.

1727 - ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) underway for anchorage area TARE in center of BRUNEI BAY.

1737 - A recapitulation of the LSTs on BROWN Beach and the times they had beached follows. Six more LSTs beached by midnight.

LST 640 - 1427	LST 637 - 1633
LST 560 - 1458	LST 709 - 1700
LST 591 - 1522	LST 941 - 1705
LST 619 - 1530	LST 585 - 1708
LST 595 - 1532	LST 638 - 1737
LST 1025 - 1606	

1804 - A report of additional minesweeping was made by CTU 78.1.5. Three more mines had been swept in Area BANJO. The SATIN LEAF (AN 43) had planted an obstruction buoy over the wreck of the SALUTE (AM 294). ANSON PASSAGE channel had been buoyed by the HMAS LACHLAN. (CTU 78.1.3 had sent the LCS(L) 47 to sink the three mines swept by the LCVFs in Area BANJO.

1808 - Anchored in berth 120 in Area TARE. Until the ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) returned to VICTORIA HARBOR anchorage there was no more visual sighting of events.

1830 - Commanding General 9th Australian Division assumed command ashore.

1920 - CTG 78.1 directed CTU 78.1.18 to have all his ships that could reach Anchorage Area TARE by 2000 to proceed there.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10 June 1945 - ZEBRA Day (continued).

HMAS MANOORA, WESTRALIA, KANIMBLA, TITANIA (AKA 13), CARTER HALL (LSD 3), the five APDs, LSMs 50, 51, 52, 53, 128, 138, 63, 64, 65, 237, 67, 168, 219, 225, 203, LCI(L)s 636, 701, 702, 703, 744, 745, 746, 749, and 955 were all unloaded on ZEBRA Day.

11 June 1945 - ZEBRA Plus ONE Day.

High broken to overcast. Scattered to broken cumulus with rain showers, mostly over land, in afternoon and evening. Wind gentle variable. Sea smooth. Visibility unrestricted.

- 0700 - CTU 78.1.16 and CTU 78.1.17, Assault Unit Commanders were directed to move units as required to unloading stations. Other units not previously issued orders were to remain in present berths until otherwise directed.
- 0700 - HMAS HAWKESBURY, ATA 184, and WALLER (DD 466) plus SAUFLEY (DD 465) escorting slow tow convoy rendezvoused near BALABAC STRAITS.
- 0710 - Lieutenant General MORSEHEAD and Admiral ROYAL left the ship and went aboard the BOISE (CL 47) to make an inspection trip to BROCKETON, MUARA, and BRUNEI BLUFF Beaches with General of the Army Douglas A. MAC ARTHUR (CinC SWPA). FCE(R) 849 was given permission to accompany the BOISE (CL 47).
- 0745 - Reinforcement Echelon arrived BRUNEI BAY and the ships were ordered to proceed to assigned berths. In this convoy were CTU 78.1.19, OTC in LST 614, plus LSTs 590, 613, 626, 697, 742, 743, 993, 1027, 1035, LCI(L)s 544, 577, 661, 662, 753, 960, 1019, 1060, FS 178, merchant ships HELEN LODJESKA, ALFRED LUNT, SIMON BAMBERGER, DWIGHT MOODY, ROBERT GRIER, escorted by ComDesRon 14 in FRAZILR (DD 607), BAILEY (DD 492), DUFILHO (DE 423), and CHARLES E. BRANNON (DE 446).
- 0810 - CTU 78.1.16 ordered all ships' crews to assist the unloading in order for all ships to retract at high tide of the same day.
- 1030 - Echelon consisting of HMAS BARCOO, OTC, plus LCTs 1310, 1312, 1314, 1317, 1319, and 1331, plus 44 LCMs, arrived BRUNEI BAY from BALABAC. The LCTs and LCMs were directed to report to CTU 78.1.16 on BROWN Beach.
- 1053 - HMAS BARCOO reported for duty and was assigned screening station by CTU 78.1.2.
- 1118 - Minesweeping operations of the greater part of Area VIOLIN produced negative results, but much damage to sweep gear.
- 1200 - COFER (APD 62) left for TAWITAWI.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

11 June 1945 - ZEBRA Plus ONE Day (continued)

- 1205 - Bogey reported by SPENCER (CGC 36) bearing 215° T, 18 miles.
- 1206 - Flash RED, control GREEN.
- 1212 - Flash BLUE, control GREEN.
- 1216 - Flash WHITE, control GREEN.
- 1218 - CLEVELAND (CL 55), escorted by HART (DD 594) and METCALF (DD 595), stood in after being detached from TG 74.2.
- 1233 - LCI(M) 362 was released by CTG 78.1 to operational control of CTF 78 at ZAMBOANGA for further orders.
- 1240 - KILLEN (DD 593) and ALBERT W. GRANT (DD 649) reported to the BOLSE (CL 47) as escorts.
- 1246 - Lieutenant General MORSEHEAD, Admiral ROYAL, and Air Vice Marshal BOSTOCK returned aboard the flagship.
- 1313 - General of the Army Douglas MacARTHUR sent congratulatory message to everyone concerned in the BRUNEI BAY operation for a flawless performance.
- 1317 - LCI(R) 72 and LCS(L) 47 were ordered to deliver combat photographers to the flagship at once.
- 1337 - Ships of CTF 74 fueled from WINOOSKI (AO 38).
- 1348 - CTG 78.1 recommended to GOC 9th Australian Division that loading of LVTs to be returned on LSTs to MOROTAI be completed by 1500/I.
- 1355 - Air Vice Marshal BOSTOCK left the ship for MOROTAI in a PBV.
- 1430 - CTG 78.1 informed CTU 78.1.16, CTU 78.1.17, CTU 78.1.2 and McALLA (DD 488), EDWARDS (DD 619), JOBB (DE 707), DAY (DE 225), that the first departing Echelon of Movement Order No. A605-45 had been cancelled.
- 1430 - TU 78.1.91 departed BRUNEI BAY for MOROTAI consisting of Screen Commander and OTC in FRAZIER (DD 607), plus BAILEY (DD 492), KLINE (APD 120), escorting HMAS MANOORA, HMAS WESTRALIA, HMAS KANIMBLA, and TITANIA (AKA 13). The latter four ships were to report to CTG 76.13.
- 1451 - CTG 78.1 requested two B-25s from FitCom 13 for cooperation with two PT boats in vicinity MIRI on 14 June from 0800 to 1000.
- 1548 - CTU 78.1.16 was ordered to get all propulsion units from LST 638 and LST 941 installed in barges as soon as possible.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

11 June 1945 - ZEBRA Plus ONE Day (continued)

- 1600 - GOC, 9th Australian Division, requested personnel embarked in LSTs, LSMs, and LCIs be put ashore BROWN Beach as soon as possible.
 - 1637 - PT patrols for night of 10 June reported strafing TUTONG, MIRI, SERIA, KUALA BELAIT, and LUTONG and that Japs were setting fire to wells and oil tanks at four last-named locations.
 - 1855 - PHILIP (DD 498), on radar picket station A-22, rescued members of an Australian Army Scout Reconnaissance Team and took them to the ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3), from where they were transferred ashore to the Australian Army. They had been scouting on the mainland when chased by Japs. The plane supposed to pick them up had not arrived when the destroyer picked them up from rubber boats.
 - 2032 - CTU 78.1.18 (Captain MANDES) was advised that he would be OTC of TU 78.1.92 departing 12 June and to turn over details of naval control in his area to CTU 78.1.13 prior 121200/I.
 - 2100 - LSMs 50, 168, 128, 138, and 219 were detailed to take empties from NASHVILLE (CL 43), PHOENIX (CL 46), CONNER (DD 582), CHARLOTTE (DD 581), and BELL (DD 587).
 - 2130 - CTU 78.1.5 reported YMS Unit in Area BAHJO had swept 25 more mines during the day. Operations in Area CELLO, CHILES, VIOLIN and TENOR were all negative.
 - 2135 - All ships in Anchorage Area TARE equipped to make smoke were ordered to be prepared to do so if and when directed between 0600 and 0800.
 - 2201 - CTF 78 directed CTG 78.1 to make 3200 barrels of diesel available to the Australian Army from the WINCCSKI (AO 38) for refueling their landing craft.
 - 2350 - CTG 78.1 directed attention of all ships present to SOPA Instructions.
 - 2400 - By midnight, all ships and units previously assigned berths in Anchorage Area TARE were assigned new berths in VICTORIA HARBOR with orders to shift prior to noon the next day.
- LSTs 560, 584, 591, 619, 640, 667, 751, 922, 585, 595, 696, and 709 were unloaded on ZEBRA plus ONE Day.

12 June 1945 - ZEBRA Plus TWO Day.

High broken to overcast. Cumuliform lower clouds very variable, from none to broken. Showers during the day, mostly over nearby land. Wind gentle variable becoming fresh southwesterly in evening due to

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

12 June 1945 - ZEBRA Plus TWO Day (continued).

nearby squalls. Sea smooth to slight. Visibility unrestricted except lowered in showers.

- 0001 - CTG 72.2 at MOROTAI was requested to make preparations to unload LSMs 50, 168, 128, 138, and 219 upon arrival 180700/I in order to facilitate a quick turn-around to BRUNELI BAY.
- 0150 - CTU 78.1.2 instructed screening vessels to coordinate their patrols.
- 0225 - SPENCER (CGC 36) proceeded to station FARGO as radar picket ship upon being released by ComLSTFlot 15 (CTU 78.1.18).
- 0332 - HMAS LACHLAN and YMS 160 were assigned berths in VICTORIA HARBOR to facilitate hydrographic work each day.
- 0352 - HMAS BARCOO ordered to relieve BANCROFT (DD 598) on Station W-9, who then relieved PHILIP (DD 498) as radar picket on station X-22.
- 0412 - All ships warned to keep clear of seaplane mooring buoys laid in the center of berths 37 and 47.
- 0628 - CTU 78.1.6 notified CTG 78.1 that wooden beacon with black and red flags had been established for Harbor Shoal.
- 0745 - ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) got underway for Berth 61 in VICTORIA HARBOR.
- 0815 - Ships of Reinforcement Unit (CTU 78.1.19) moved to assigned berths in VICTORIA HARBOR and reported to CTU 78.1.16 for unloading instructions.
- 0907 - Lieutenant General MORSEHEAD, GOC 1st Australian Corps, and Rear Admiral ROYAL left the ship to confer ashore with Major General WOOLLEN, GOC 9th Australian Division.
- 0953 - ROCKY MOUNT anchored in Berth 61.
- 1000 - Ships not sailing in TU 78.1.92 began shifting berths to those assigned them in VICTORIA HARBOR.
- 1030 - CTU 78.1.16 and Staff transferred from LST 640 to ROCKY MOUNT to permit LST 640 to sail. CTU 78.1.16 was also to be SEVENTH Amphibious Force Representative, BRUNELI BAY, upon departure of CTG 78.1 from the area.
- 1100 - ComLSTFlot 15 (CTU 78.1.18) transferred his flag to LST 574.
- 1100 - CTU 78.1.18 was relieved of naval control of WHITE-GREEN Beaches by CTU 78.1.13.
- 1200 - Control of air support was passed to RAAF.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

12 June 1945 - ZEBRA Plus T.O Day (continued).

- 1225 - LST 640 launched pontoon causeways.
- 1245 - Two LCMs reported as ordered to LST 640.
- 1350 - Lieutenant General MCASHHEAD and Rear Admiral ROYAL returned aboard the flagship.
- 1400 - CTG 74.3 (Rear Admiral Russel F. BERKEY) came aboard the flagship to confer with CTG 78.1.
- 1425 - Two LCTs requested to unload pontoon gear from LST 696 and LST 640.
- 1440 - LST 696 launched pontoon causeways.
- 1445 - Rear Admiral BERKEY left the ship.
- 1455 - CTU 78.1.13 reported all naval shipping clear of RED-YELLOW Beach Area except LCI 546.
- 1600 - LSTs 640 and 696 unloaded Seabees and equipment for causeways into LCTs.
- 1628 - FT patrols reported for night of 11-12 June still produced only slight reaction from the enemy.
- 1700 - A causeway from LST 640 (of two sections) was beached at BROWN TWO Beach and one from LST 696 was taken to VICTORIA Town pier area.
- 1800 - CTG 74.1 (Commodore FARNCOMB) in HMAS HOBART with HMAS ARUNTA departed BRUNEI BAY for TAWITANI.
- 1800 - ComLSTFlot 15, OTC of TU 78.1.92 in LST 574 departed BRUNEI BAY with LSTS 560, 574, 584, 585, 591, 595, 619, 637, 638, 640, 696, 709, 751, 805, 922, 936, 937, 941, 942, 1025, LCIs 636, 701, 702, 703, 744, 745, LCI(R)s 31, 34, 338, LSMs 50, 51 52, 53, 64, 65, 67, 68, 128, 138, 168, 203, 219, 225, 237, SCUFFLE (AM 298), screened by ALBERT T. HARRIS (DE 447), CHARLES E. BRANNON (DE 446), JOBB (DE 707), DAY (DE 225), SC 750 and SC 698.
- 1800 - LCS(L)s 42, 45, 46, and 47 reported to PHILIP (DD 498) in vicinity of patrol station X-10 to cover minesweeping at LUTONG - MIRI. The McCALLA (DD 488) accompanied this group.
- 2017 - NCDU teams 2 and 3 which made the trip back on the KLINE (APD 120) were ordered to report to CTG 76.13 at MOROTAI on 141800 after being put aboard LCI(D) 228.
- 2034 - SPENCER (CGC 36) reported a bogey bearing 185° T, distance eight miles. Flash RED, control YELLOW was set immediately.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

12 June 1945 - ZEBRA Plus TWO Day (continued).

- 2103 - No attack had developed. The bogey faded, and Flash WHITE, control YELLOW was ordered.
- 2103 - YMS 340 reported Area BANJO was completely swept, five mines being found. Area CELLO was found negative for moored and acoustic mines. The southern part of CELLO was swept for magnetic mines with negative results.
- 2335 - All ships in anchorage area were ordered to be prepared to make smoke from 0600 to 0800 the next day, if equipped to do so.

LSTs 637, 638, 806, 912, 936, 937, 942, LCIs 544, 661, 662, 753, 960, 1019, 1060, and LSM 68 were unloaded on ZEBRA plus TWO Day.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART III

ORDNANCE

A. PERFORMANCE OF OWN ORDNANCE.

1. Will be covered in individual ship's action reports.

B. PERFORMANCE OF ENEMY ORDNANCE.

1. No coastal guns were discovered. A few trenches and air-raid shelters were located. No effective opposition to the landing was encountered on the beaches; only slight mortar fire was reported against the first wave.

2. Through the 16th of June a total of 440 moored contact mines were swept in the BRUNEI BAY and MIRI Areas -- 102 in BRUNEI BAY and 338 off MIRI. One mine in the BRUNEI BAY Area caused casualties to own forces, when USS SALUTE (AM 294) struck a mine and sank. A chart of the minesweeping areas is included as Appendix 1 to Part III of this report. The minesweeping was in general carried out according to schedule despite heavy casualties to Minesweeping gear both from mines and underwater obstructions. A complete report of minesweeping activities will be furnished by CTG 78.1.5. The following is a summary from the information at hand, of mines swept:

- 7 June - 34 mines swept in Area PICCOLO.
- 8 June - 34 mines swept in Area PICCOLO; SALUTE (AM 294) struck one mine and sank.
- 9 June - 1 mine swept in Area PICCOLO.
- 10 June - 3 mines swept by LCVs in Area BANJO.
- 11 June - 25 mines swept in Area BANJO.
- 12 June - 5 mines swept in Area BANJO.
- 13 June - 92 mines swept in MIRI Area. Thirty-one mines swept in Lat. 04-34.5, Long. 113-53.2 and Lat. 04-27.8, Long. 113-52.5. Sixty-one other mines in same general area.
- 14 June - 72 mines swept in MIRI Area. MIRI minefield appears to be continuous line extending from shoal water west of TANJONG BARAM in a southwesterly direction following the curve of the shoreline approximately nine miles from the beach.
- 15 June - 82 mines swept in MIRI minefield area, Areas GRASS and FIAX.
- 16 June - 92 mines swept in MIRI minefield area, Area GRASS.

The MIRI minefield was apparently laid as a submarine barrier in depths in excess of 40 feet. All mines swept in both BRUNEI BAY and MIRI Areas were reported as moored, chemical horn, contact mines.


APPENDIX

1. Minesweeping Areas.


DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART IV

DAMAGE

A. DAMAGE TO OWN FORCES.

1. USS SALUTE (AM 294) struck a mine on the afternoon of 8 June 1945, 1½ miles south southwest of BARAT Banks, in Latitude 05-08.5 North, Longitude 115-05 East. The ship suffered extensive hull damage and later sank at 2300(I) near Buoy 4. Casualties were four men killed and 37 wounded.

B. DAMAGE TO ENEMY SHIPPING.

1. One large sailboat at JESSELTON was rendered unserviceable by FT patrols the night of 11 June.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

1. The bombardment of ZEBRA minus THREE, TWO and ONE days was delivered as scheduled. Throughout this period there was no enemy reaction to our bombardment.
2. On ZEBRA Day the following ships were assigned to support the landings:
 - (a) BROWN Beach.
PHOENIX, BOISE, HOBART, KILLEN, A. W. GRANT and CONNER plus 1 LCI(M), 3 LCS(L)s, 2 LCI(R)s, 2 LCI(G)s.
 - (b) GREEN and WHITE Beaches.
NASHVILLE, ARUNTA, CHARRETTE, BELL, plus 4 LCI(G)s, 4 LCI(R)s, 1 LCI(M), 2 LCS(L)s.
3. The bombardment on ZEBRA Day was delivered as scheduled. The CONNER, with no assigned targets, took position between the Line of Departure and PAPPAN ISLAND and took under fire targets of opportunity on PAPPAN ISLAND and BROWN Beach.
4. Because of the wide separation of the Northern and Southern landings the Commander Cruiser Covering Group in NASHVILLE was given naval gunfire control of the Southern sector and BRUNEL Attack Group Commander in ROCKY MOUNT took control of the Northern sector.
5. A spotting plane schedule was furnished CTG 78.1 by CTG 74.3, with the result that a spotting plane was continuously available for the naval gunfire controller on the naval gunfire circuit. This proved very satisfactory except with the new type spotting plane furnished by the NASHVILLE (CL43) which was not able to change frequencies in the air.
6. Based on information now available, the following amounts of ammunition were expended in scheduled fire prior to the time of landing.

BROWN Beach

2163 Rounds 6"
2253 Rounds 5"
420 Rounds 3"
1000 Rounds 4.2" Mortar H.E.
1920 Rounds 4.5" Rocket H.E.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

6. (Continued)

GREEN and WHITE Beaches

3571 Rounds 6"
5466 Rounds 5"
1117 Rounds 4"
560 Rounds 3"
1000 Rounds 4.2" Mortars
2320 Rounds 4.5" Rockets

7. The following missions were fired after the landing:

(a) BROWN Beach.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Target</u>
June 10	1000	HOBART	Troop Concentration
June 10	1500	KILLEN	Machine gun nest
June 10	1703	GRANT	Neutralization fire
June 10	1803	KILLEN	Camouflaged boats
June 11	0905	GRANT	Road junction
June 12	1100	HOBART METCALF	MEMPAKUL Area harassing fire
June 12	1430	HART	Troop movements

June 13 DD METCALF fires on caves on northwest side of LABUAN ISLAND, target area 802938, using plane spot. Spotting plane spotted for anti-aircraft artillery registration on MEMPAKUL.

(b) GREEN and WHITE Beaches (BRUNEI SECTOR)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Target</u>
June 11	1455	CHARRETTE	Defended positions southwest of BRUNEI BLUFF.
June 11	2130	BURNS	Road junction north of BRUNEI Air Strip

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

7. (b) (Continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Target</u>
June 12	0010 0230 0445	BURNS	Road junction north of BRUNEI Air Strip
June 12	1145	BURNS	West of BRUNEI Air Strip
June 12	1500	BELL	KRULAP KAMPONG (village) Area 476408.
June 12	1600	HOBART	Ridges northeast of BRUNEI
June 12/13	2300 0100 0300	BELL	Night harassing fire, northeast of BRUNEI.
June 13/14	night	CHARRETTE	Night harassing fire on road west of CLIFFORD Bridge in BRUNEI Town.
June 14/15	night	CHARRETTE	Night harassing fire on ridges northeast of BRUNEI Town

(c) EAST COAST of BRUNEI BAY - Western Sector.

June 16 - DD BELL stood by to provide fire support for hydro-
graphic survey party. None required.

June 17 - DD CHARRETTE and DD BELL stood by to provide fire
support if required to cover the assault on WESTON.
No opposition was encountered and no fire support
required.

B. AIR SUPPORT

1. Organization and Control.

- (a) Aircraft employed in direct and close support of the BRUNEI
Operation were provided by the Royal Australian Air Force Command,
augmented by units of the Thirteenth Air Force, United States
Army Air Force, and the First Tactical Air Force, Royal Australian
Air Force. With regard to direct support at the objective area
and of fighter protection for convoys, responsibility was equally
divided between these two commands. The Thirteenth Air Force was

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

B. AIR SUPPORT.

1. (a) (Continued)

the exclusive source of air cover for cooperation flights with motor torpedo boat operations; of aircraft employed in photographic service from ZEBRA minus THREE to ZEBRA Day; and of the daily Combat Air Patrol of four fighters and daily dawn and dusk patrol of two night fighters at the objective area. A resume of fighter director activities appears in a separate section of this report.

- (b) Anti-submarine patrols in support of the approach and assault were conducted by aircraft of the SEVENTH Fleet, excepting cover along the convoy route between MOROTAI and ZAMBOANGA which was furnished by the Thirteenth Air Force. An air-sea rescue plane, provided by the First Tactical Air Force, was present in the objective area throughout the period of direct support, and Commander Task Group 74.3 also maintained one VO-VCS aircraft in a readiness status for this purpose.
- (c) From ZEBRA minus THREE Day through ZEBRA minus ONE Day, strike groups at the target area were controlled by an Advance Commander Support Aircraft embarked in the U.S.S. NASHVILLE. The controlling unit was composed of representatives of both the Thirteenth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force. This control was relinquished to Commander Task Group 78.1 beginning on ZEBRA Day.
- (d) Because of the distance between landing beaches the area of air support responsibility was divided into a Northern and Southern Sector, and immediate direction of supporting aircraft was assigned to two separate controlling units. The dividing line between the sectors was Latitude 05° 10' N. Direction of air activity in the Northern Sector, embracing LABUAN ISLAND and the KLIAS Peninsula, was exercised by an Australian Army Air Force controller embarked in the U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT. He was assisted by officers of the First Tactical Air Force (RAAF), a representative of the Thirteenth Air Force, and by the officer and enlisted personnel of Air Support Control Unit, Commander Task Group 78.1. Direction of air activity in the Southern Sector, embracing BRUNEI and MUARA ISLAND, was exercised by the unit aboard the U.S.S. NASHVILLE which had previously functioned as Advance Commander Support Aircraft.
- (e) Air Support in the Northern Sector was supplied by the First Tactical Air Force (RAAF), the direct support strike groups consisting of six Beaufighters on station daily from 0730 to 1630.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

B. AIR SUPPORT.

1. (e) (Continued)

Commander Support Aircraft Southern Sector functioned with strike groups of six B-25s provided by the Thirteenth Air Force. Commencing at 0730 on ZEBRA minus THREE Day and continuing until ZEBRA Day, an Air Observer from the Ninth Australian Division was airborne over the objective area daily from 0730 to 1630, and two such observers, one for each sector as above-described, were present over the target areas from ZEBRA Day and thereafter.

- (f) According to the air plan, control in each sector was to be transferred separately to each of the Air Support Parties attached to the two assault brigades upon their establishment ashore and readiness to assume control. Then, in turn, control was to be reunited in the Royal Australian Air Force Air Support Section when that unit moved its headquarters on LABUAN ISLAND. This procedure was not followed due to the inability of the Air Support Parties to establish adequate communications. Each Air Support Party, during the period of control by Commander Task Group 78.1, directed strikes at times under the supervision of the respective Commanders Support Aircraft afloat. However, ultimate control remained with Commander Task Group 78.1 until it was passed directly ashore to the Royal Australian Air Force Air Support Section at 1200 on ZEBRA plus THREE Day.

2. Narrative.

(a) Pre-ZEBRA Day Air Operations.

- (1) Commencing on ZEBRA minus TEN Day and extending through ZEBRA minus FOUR Day, the Thirteenth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force (RAAF) conducted a series of strikes against northwestern and southern BORNED, including selected targets in the BRUNEI area, for the purpose of neutralizing enemy airfields, destroying planes, shipping, installations and harassing troop movements. From ZEBRA minus THREE Day to ZEBRA minus ONE Day, special strikes were carried out against designated fixed installations and military positions in the BRUNEI area. Areas hit repeatedly during this period were LABUAN ISLAND, MUARA ISLAND, BROOKETON TOWN, BRUNEI TOWN and BRUNEI BLUFF area. Pre-ZEBRA Day air strikes, though for the most part pre-set, were carried out under the supervisory control of the Advance Commander Support Aircraft.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

B. AIR SUPPORT.

(2) All scheduled strikes during the pre-landing phase were well executed, target areas were thoroughly saturated, and coordination with naval gunfire was excellent. The only difficulty encountered came about as the result of the failure of two B-24 squadrons to report into the Support Air Direction net and secure authoritative clearance from Commander Support Aircraft for a pre-arranged strike on the BROWN Beach area encompassing a position in which an under-water demolition team was working. Some of the bombs fell in the water killing one man and injuring three others. The bomb coverage of these strikes was so thorough that few fixed defenses remained for the attention of the direct support groups during the assault phase. In remote support of the landing, armed reconnaissance strikes were conducted in the HALMAHERA, CELEBES, and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES regions.

(b) ZEBRA Day pre-arranged Strikes.

- (1) In support of the landing on LABUAN ISLAND, the First Tactical Air Force, with 14 B-24s each loaded with 7000 pounds of 100-pound fragmentation bombs, carried out a pre-set, sustained, anti-personnel attack between D-35 and D-15 minutes on Area A immediately south of the LABUAN Airstrip. From D-15 to D plus 45 minutes (one-half hour late according to plan), four squadrons of six B-24s each, provided by the Thirteenth Air Force and with similar bomb load, carried out a like attack on Area C, the peninsula above HAMILTON POINT on southern LABUAN. One of these groups was scheduled to bomb Area B, the BROWN Beach and VICTORIA TOWN Area, but mechanical difficulty with a bombsight prevented the group from conducting its strike within the allotted time limit, and to avoid endangering assault forces, an alternative target was chosen. The delay in attacking Area C was necessary in order to avoid interference with bombing runs to be made by other aircraft over the adjacent Area B.
- (2) In support of landings in the BRUNEI BLUFF Area, one heavy bomber squadron of the Thirteenth Bomber Command carried out anti-personnel attacks between H-35 and H-15 minutes against GREEN Beach and vicinity. From H-30 to H Hour six P-38s of the Thirteenth Fighter Command struck the BRUNEI TOWN Area. A similar attack was made from H plus 60 to 90 minutes, the target area including the BRUNEI-BROOKETON Road.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

B. AIR SUPPORT.

- (3) In support of the landings on MUARA ISLAND, one heavy bomber squadron of the Thirteenth Bomber Command performed a sustained anti-personnel attack on the WHITE Beach Area from J-35 to J-15 minutes.
- (c) ZEBRA Day to ZEBRA plus TWO Day Direct Strike Support.
 - (1) Northern Sector.
 - a. Pre-ZEBRA Day aerial bombardment resulted in an effective neutralization of LABUAN ISLAND and a complete destruction of the fixed installations. This, together with the absence of enemy resistance to assaulting ground forces, rendered close air support negligible. During the morning of ZEBRA Day, no called missions were requested by Air Liaison Parties, and direct support groups were directed against targets of opportunity on the BORNEO mainland, including LINKUNGAN TOWN and Plantation, located on the eastern shore of BRUNEI BAY, and the railroad line between WESTON and JESSELTON. Three rail bridges were damaged beyond immediate use.
 - b. On the afternoon of ZEBRA Day, strikes were assigned in response to requests of the First Air Support Party against roads, road junctions, buildings, and possible enemy troops positions, all situated in central and northern LABUAN. ZEBRA plus ONE Day and TWO Day air support adhered to the same pattern; mainland missions were carried out against the following assigned areas: The village of BINSULOK on the southern shore of KIMANIS BAY was subjected to both strafing and bombing attacks; BEAUFORT Plantation was strafed; and the WESTON-JESSELTON railway was again bombed. The remaining missions were conducted against roads, buildings, vehicles, and supply areas on LABUAN, including one Napalm strike upon the northern end of the TIMBALAI airstrip.
 - c. Air Support statistical data covering air activity in the Northern Sector is as follows: The total tonnage of bombs expended was 170.5 tons, including 133 tons of 100 pound anti-personnel fragmentation bombs and 37.5 tons of 500 pound bombs (general purpose, high explosive, and incendiary); sixteen 165 gallon Napalm bombs were dropped; the total number of sorties, excluding those of the air observation planes, was 131; the total number of

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

B. AIR SUPPORT.

c. (Continued)

strike missions was 23; 10 of these missions resulted from requests of the Air Liaison or Air Support Parties; the remaining 8 originated with Commander Support Aircraft North; 5 strikes were pre-set; and no mission requests were refused.

(2) Southern Sector.

- a. The narrative of direct air support performance and air statistics in connection with the Southern Sector was submitted to Commander Task Group 78.1 by Commander Support Aircraft South in a brief despatch. The LIMBANG staging area south and east of BRUNEI TOWN was twice bombed, and buildings and huts were destroyed or rendered unserviceable. Motor transports in the TUTONG Area were repeatedly hit and damaged. Accurate coverage and great damage resulted from two strikes conducted in the PELONG ROCK area. A total of four strikes was made upon enemy barges; 4 were destroyed by burning, and 10 were thoroughly holed by strafing.
- b. The Souther Air Support controller, in his brief report to Commander Task Group 78.1, submitted one inseparable statistical summary covering both the air operations during the assault phase in the Southern Sector and those occurring within the entire BRUNEI Area during his three day period of control as Advanced Commander Support Aircraft. The report reads as follows: 295 tons of bombs were expended, 12 tons of 500 pound GP, 3.6 tons of anti-personnel bombs, and 279.4 tons of 100 pound bombs; twelve 165 gallon Napalm bombs were expended; the total number of sorties was 196; the total number of strike missions, bombing and strafing, was 33; of these, 23 originated with Commander Support Aircraft or were directed in the Air Support Plan; the remaining 10 were based upon requests issued by the Air Liaison Parties or the Second Air Support Party; no mission requests were rejected.
- d. As in previous operations, the cooperation flights of aircraft covering Motor Torpedo Boat operations were not under the direction of Commander Support Aircraft, and the summary of their performance is a topic to be found in the action report of Commander Task Group 70.1.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C. TROOPS AND CARGO.

1. Loading Narrative.

(a) Preliminary.

- (1) The loading of TG 78.1 was conducted at MOROTAI, NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. There are four docks at MOROTAI capable of handling large AKAs and APAs; however, these were not made available to CTG 78.1 by the GHQ Regulating Office because of the limited amount of cargo to be embarked in LSIs and the AKA, and also because of the large amount of shipping from the mainland of Australia which had to discharge cargo for both the 9th and the 7th Australian Divisions. Upon the recommendation of CTG 78.1 beaches for the LSTs and LSMs were improved by Royal Australian Engineers. A temporary sea wall made of sand-filled oil drums, discarded NL Pontoon Cells, coconut logs, and coral fill was constructed on the south end of BLUE Beach. LSTs were beached at high tide and ramps were lowered onto this sea wall.
- (2) The assault shipping for the BRUNEI BAY Operation consisted of 1 AKA, 3 Australian LSIs, 34 LSTs, 20 LSMs, 5 APDs and 22 LCIs. Total tonnages were limited by Vice Admiral BARBEY, Commander Task Force 78, as follows:

AKA - 550 short tons
LSI - 500 short tons
LST - 600 short tons
LSM - 150 short tons
- (3) The overall planning was done with the 9th Australian Division at MOROTAI. However, the Divisions delegated the planning to the Brigades, and 1st Australian Corps delegated the responsibility for loading RAAF to Administrative RAAF Command instead of to the Division. Australian Army Headquarters (LHQ) supervised the loading of what was termed "heavy shipping" that is, the AKA and the LSIs. However, this unusual administrative policy did not cause any great amount of confusion because of the light cargo load in these four ships. The actual planning for this operation began on about 30 April and the first elements of the 62nd Air Construction Wing were loaded at MOROTAI on 3 May. The remainder of the 62nd Air Construction Wing were loaded at BIAK on 8 and 9 May.
- (4) No pallets were used because material and time were not available for their construction. Sleds loaded with arc mesh were placed at the bows of LSTs and LSMs where they could be easily unloaded and the mesh used for surfacing.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C. TROOPS AND CARGO.

(b) Loading at MOROTAI.

- (1) Loading of the 9th Australian Division (Reinforced) less the 26th Brigade began on 3 May and continued until 3 June. The long loading period was caused by a postponement of the date of the operation and the delay in the arrival of troops and cargo in the staging area from Australia. LSTs were beached to take on partial loads of cargo, after which they were retracted and beached a second time and in a few cases a third time, to take on the vehicles. Vehicles arrived for the assault echelon as late as 29 May. However, the great majority of troops and vehicles were loaded during the period 29 May to 2 June.
- (2) LSTs were loaded at BLUE Beach from 3 May to 3 June.
- (3) LSMs were loaded at DOCK ONE JETTY from 29 May to 3 June.
- (4) TITANIA (AKA 13) began loading on 21 May and completed on 3 June. The delay was caused by late arrival of 15 vehicles.
- (5) LSIs loaded from 25 May to 30 May.
- (6) The CARTER HALL (LSD 3) loaded 18 LCMs on 31 May.
- (7) The APDs embarked troops from DOCK ONE on 29 May.
- (8) The LCIs embarked troops from 30 May to 2 June. These troops were lightered to the LCIs with LCMs and LCTs from the vicinity of the staging area. This method saved a 15-mile truck haul.
- (9) LCTs and LCMs. No LCTs or LCMs were towed in this operation. Six LCTs and forty-three LCMs were convoyed from TARAKAN, BORNEO, to the objective. Eight LCMs were carried on the TITANIA and 18 in the CARTER HALL. These LCMs belonged to the 593rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, U. S. Army.

(c) Loading at BIAK and WOENDI.

- (1) The 62nd Air Construction Wing was loaded in four LSTs at BIAK. The load of one of these had to be readjusted at MOROTAI.
- (2) The Port Director Unit was loaded in one LST at WOENDI with the exception of the Mobile Communication Unit No. 15 which was loaded at MOROTAI. The remainder of the space available in the LST was used by Division troops and cargo.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C. TROOPS AND CARGO.

- (3) Training Exercise. No cargo was unloaded and no landing craft were beached during the rehearsal exercise held on 31 May and 1 June.
- (4) Aids to Unloading. Seven LSTs carried two strings of (2 x 30) pontoon causeways. Three LSTs carried two (3 x 7) and two (3 x 12) pontoon barges each. Ten propulsion units accompanied these twelve barges. There were a total of 91 LVTs (7 of which were administrative or maintenance vehicles) and 58 DUKWs used in the operation.
- (5) Appendix 1 of this report headed "9th Australian Division Distribution of Force to Ships" is the consolidated embarkation table. Weights shown are in long tons for bulk cargo. Weights of vehicles are not included in the table. There were approximately 23,000 short tons of cargo and vehicles lifted for this operation, including 2746 vehicles of all kinds.
- (6) Three XAKs and a small ammunition ship were loaded at MOROTAI; two of the XAKs carried Division cargo and one was loaded with RAAF cargo. These four ships and an additional XAK and Army FS ship, which were loaded in Australia, were included in the ZEBRA plus ONE convoy. They were not combat-loaded nor were they to be unloaded during the assault phase of the operation.
- (7) There were 30 LSTs and 16 LSMs from the assault shipping assigned to carry approximately 6000 troops, 1700 assorted vehicles and 4000 long tons of bulk cargo in resupply echelons. These echelons were to arrive at the objective area about ZEBRA plus EIGHTEEN Day.

2. Unloading Narrative.

- (a) Unloading of the transport divisions, the AKA and the assault LSMs was completed on ZEBRA Day. LST unloading progressed slowly on ZEBRA plus ONE and TWO Days.
- (b) All assault shipping of the initial echelon had completed unloading on ZEBRA plus TWO Day with the exception of ships carrying the Division Reserve, which were not unloaded for tactical reasons.
- (c) Unloading at BROWN Beach. LSMs were somewhat delayed in unloading, mainly due to difficulties with vehicles and to a depth of water of about 3 feet at the ramps; vehicles drowned out in some cases and in many cases had to be towed out of the ships. The Shore Party

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C. TROOPS AND CARGO.

2. (c) (Continued)

Equipment was in the high priority LSTs which came in after LSMs were retracted. This is not considered to be a sound loading scheme and will not be employed again. Three LSMs were stuck on the beach and blocked three favorable slots for LSTs. When LSTs came in some did not get dry ramps. Unloading was also slow until the tide receded. Contrary to predicted tide tables there was a diurnal tide. Therefore ramps were dry a much shorter time than was expected. LSTs which had not completely discharged by the time the tide came in were unloaded by DUKWs and LCMs. Petroleum drums were floated ashore in many cases. LSMs were used for unloading the AKA and one of the LSIs. Many LCMs were allowed to dry out on the beach because of the slowness of unloading and the rapid drop of the tide. There was an adequate road net back of the beach and an excellent area for cargo dumps and vehicle parks. Cargo was moved inland rapidly and at no time was the beach congested. Enemy action in no way hampered the unloading of vehicles or cargo.

- (d) Unloading on Southern Beaches. Unloading on the southern beaches presented an unusual problem in that the ultimate unloading was over YELLOW Beach which was not available to LSTs. Vehicles from LSTs for YELLOW Beach were unloaded onto SAPO Point, MUARA ISLAND from beached LSTs and then reloaded into LCMs and LSMs which could negotiate the restricted channel. Four pontoon barges were used to off-load bulk cargo in the stream and these were then towed to YELLOW Beach for unloading. This awkward unloading was successfully and expeditiously accomplished mainly due to the resourcefulness and energy of the Assault Unit Commander on WHITE Beach and the beach personnel responsible for the unloading. Both Army and Navy personnel performed excellently.

- (1) Conditions on RED Beach. SAPO Point on RED Beach proved to be the only good beaching area. There was space here to beach 2 LSTs and 2 LSMs simultaneously, although on ZEBRA plus TWO 3 LSTs beached at one time. Barges were used in the later stages to transport cargo from SAPO Point to YELLOW Beach. These barges were either run in to shore alongside LSMs and LCIs or were taken in by LCMs. Loading of barges seemed to be extremely slow.
- (2) Conditions on YELLOW Beach. At BROCKETON Pier 3 was used to berth LCIs for unloading and Pier 5 was for unloading LCMs and barges. Only 2 LSMs could be beached at a time. LSMs beached just North of Pier 5. There was a strong current at YELLOW Beach which necessitated LSMs beaching at high speed.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C. TROOPS AND CARGO.

3. Unloading Report.

Ships completed unloading as follows:

<u>ZEBRA Day</u>	<u>ZEBRA plus ONE Day</u>	<u>ZEBRA plus TWO Day</u>
HMAS MANOORA *	USS LST 560	USS LST 637
HMAS KANIMELA *	USS LST 584	USS LST 638
HMAS WESTRALIA *	USS LST 591	USS LST 806
USS TITANIA (AKA 13) *	USS LST 619	USS LST 912
USS CARTER HALL (LSD 3)	USS LST 640	USS LST 936
USS LLOYD (APD 63)	USS LST 667	USS LST 937
USS NEWMAN (APD 59)	USS LST 751	USS LST 942
USS LIDDLE (APD 60)	USS LST 922	
USS KEPHART (APD 61)	USS LST 585	USS LCI 544
USS DIACHENKO (APD 123)	USS LST 595	USS LCI 661
	USS LST 696	USS LCI 662
	USS LST 709	USS LCI 753
USS LSM 50		USS LCI 960
USS LSM 51		USS LCI 1019
USS LSM 52		USS LCI 1060
USS LSM 53		
USS LSM 128		
USS LSM 138		USS LSM 68
USS LSM 63		
USS LSM 64		
USS LSM 65		
USS LSM 67		
USS LSM 168		
USS LSM 219		
USS LSM 225		
USS LSM 237		
USS LSM 203		
USS LCI 636		
USS LCI 701		
USS LCI 702		
USS LCI 703		
USS LCI 744		
USS LCI 745		
USS LCI 746		
USS LCI 749		
USS LCI 955		

(*) Indicates: Left area on ZEBRA plus ONE Day.

Appendix

1. 9th Australian Division Distribution of Forces to Ships.

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

OPERATION 0802 SIX XIS 3080

[illegible][illegible]

APPENDIX I TO PART V C

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT, AND BEACH ORGANIZATION

1. Landing Craft Control

- (a) Commander Control Unit BROWN (CTU 78.1.41) in PC 1120 organized and operated in accordance with Standard Operating Procedure for LCCO's, Com7thPhib Serial 2822 of 12 November 1944.
- (b) Ships assigned were as follows:
 - PC 1120 - Primary Control, BROWN Beaches ONE and TWO.
 - SC 732 - Left Flank Guide Ship, BROWN Beach ONE.
 - SC 698 - Right Flank Guide Ship, BROWN Beach TWO.
- (c) The Line of Departure was established at 0730 on ZEBRA Day. SC 732 and SC 698 were secured from Line of Departure at 1400. PC 1120 then took station 1200 yards off shore on right flank of BROWN Beach TWO, to control small boat traffic.
- (d) Details of operations in the assault phase are set forth in Paragraph 2 below (Ship-to-Shore movement).
- (e) Commander Control Unit BROWN secured from PC 1120 at 1400 on ZEBRA plus ONE Day, and reported on board USS ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3).

2. Ship-to-Shore Movement

- (a) The assault landing was made under ideal conditions - light winds, calm sea, and unlimited visibility. Troops were boated and landing craft launched well within scheduled time limits, and all waves proceeded to their stations on the Line of Departure in orderly fashion. Fire support craft were deployed on station at Line of Departure at 0745, and proceeded on first run to beach at 0800.
- (b) Waves ONE to SEVEN, comprising the assault waves, were dispatched from the Line of Departure on schedule. All waves maintained their proper echelon formation throughout the run to the beach. Landing times for all waves were generally good, although waves TWO, THREE, and FOUR on BROWN Beach ONE anticipated their scheduled landing times somewhat. LCI 955, constituting wave SEVEN on BROWN Beach ONE, was unable to beach with sufficiently shallow water off her ramps for troops to disembark safely. They were transferred to the beach in LCMs provided for this contingency.
- (c) On order of Commander BROWN Assault Unit, Wave EIGHT, the first of the 24th Brigade Reserve waves, was dispatched from the Line of Departure at 0950. Waves NINE, ELEVEN, and TWELVE of the Brigade Reserve were dispatched at five minute intervals, commencing at 1043.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT, AND BEACH ORGANIZATION

2. (d) Wave TEN of the Brigade Reserve, consisting of 8 LSMs and 3 LCIs, was ordered in to the beach by Commander BROWN Assault Unit as slots became available. Likewise, beaching and unloading of LSTs was supervised directly by Commander BROWN Assault Unit in conjunction with the LST Beaching Officer and the Beach Parties.

(e) Troops comprising the 9th Australian Division Reserve were not landed during the assault phase.

(f) GREEN Beach (BRUNEI Bluff)

(1) Commander Control Unit GREEN (CTU 78.1.42) in SC 741 with SC 750 as guide ship established the Line of Departure and operated as per schedule.

(2) LCVF waves 1, 2 and 3, and LCM wave 4 were dispatched and landed on the limits of GREEN Beach with proper timing. LSM 237, the only ship to be beached on GREEN Beach, discharged its cargo under favorable conditions.

(g) WHITE Beach (MUARA Island)

(1) Commander Control Unit WHITE (CTU 78.1.43) in PC 1122 with LCI(L) 546 as guide ship established the Line of Departure and controlled the WHITE Beach movement.

(2) LVT waves 1, 2 and 3 were dispatched and landed on WHITE Beach in accordance with scheduled timing.

(3) Five LSTs, two LSMs were beached and discharged on RED Beach. LCIs, LCMs and other small craft discharged alongside Pier 3, RED Beach.

(h) YELLOW Beach (BROOKETON)

The troops which landed on GREEN Beach, BRUNEI Bluff, occupied YELLOW Beach, by overland movement. LSMs beached for discharging. LCIs, LCMs and pontoon barges discharged alongside piers.

3. Beach Organization

(a) Preliminary studies of BRUNEI BAY hydrographic and beach conditions were made at MOROTAI prior to the departure of Amphibious Group SIX for the TARAKAN Operation. On 1 May 1945 Amphibious Group SIX returned and formal planning commenced. Beaching Plans for LSTs, LCIs and LSMs in the ship to shore movement for the assault beaches on LABUAN ISLAND and the mainland were completed and delivered to the commanders of the assault units upon their arrival at MOROTAI.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT, AND BEACH ORGANIZATION

3. (b) The Group Beachmaster maintained a liaison with the following commands throughout the planning/staging periods.

9th Australian Division Headquarters
20th and 24th Brigade Headquarters
1st Beach Group Command (Division Shore Party)
R.A.N. Beach Commando A (Principal Beachmaster)
9th Australian Division (Principal Military Landing Officer)
Commander Brown Assault Unit (USN)
Commander Green/White Assault Unit (USN)
Commander Robert Pearson, R.A.N. (Officer in charge Amphibious Training, R.A.N.)

- (c) The air photo coverage of the target area was exceptionally good. Photos were made available showing beach conditions under varying stages of the tides up to the day before the assault. The information gained therefrom was disseminated to all sections of the military and naval commands.
- (d) Underwater Demolition Team ELEVEN made a reconnaissance of the BROWN Beaches 8 June 1945. Thirty copies of their report with supporting blue prints of soundings and beach profiles were distributed to: Assault Unit Commanders, Landing Force Commander, LCCO, Landing Craft Beaching Officer and to the Beachmasters. Delivery was completed at the target by 0800 on 10 June.
- (e) HMAS LACHLAN made a close inshore reconnaissance of GREEN and WHITE Beaches on 8-9 June. This ship and YMS 160 buoyed navigational channels and hazards, and made check surveys of the waters at the objective which contributed much to the success of the operation.
- (f) The assault troops landed simultaneously, as per schedule on BROWN, GREEN and WHITE Beaches. Troops who landed on GREEN Beach occupied YELLOW Beach and the troops who landed on WHITE occupied RED Beach unopposed. The LSIs, AKA, LSMs, LCIs together with the LSTs of the WHITE Assault were unloaded on the target day. Seven LSTs of the BROWN Assault Unit were unloaded by 1500, 11 June. The remaining 12 LSTs of this unit were unloaded on 12 June. YELLOW Beach was the final destination for cargo on the Southern beaches. It was necessary to partially unload certain ships at RED Beach on the target day. This cargo was lightered to YELLOW Beach on 12 - 13 June thereby completing the cargo unloading for that sector. The Reinforcement Unit ships were unloaded on BROWN Beach 0700, 14 June.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT, AND BEACH ORGANIZATION

3. (g) Twelve pontoon barges were carried to the target area side-loaded on LSTs. These barges were supplied by USASOS, Finschafen, for delivery to the 9th Australian Division. No fittings or deck gear was supplied with the barges, and propulsion units were unmounted. USS CULEBRA ISLAND at MOROTAI made and fitted bits for the barges but the ten propulsion units supplied by USASOS could not be attached until the barges were launched at BRUNEI. Four of the barges were operated as dumb barges by the White Assault Unit and served a good purpose during the cargo unloading. These were then towed to BROWN Beach where the USS CARTER HALL, assisted by personnel of the 111 Naval Construction Battalion, mounted the ten propulsion units. Australian Port Construction Battalion crews then took them over for army operation.

(h) Seven pontoon causeways (two sections each) were side carried on the LSTs of Assault Unit BROWN. The causeways were not required for unloading assault shipping. Two causeways were launched and installed on the BROWN Beaches on 12 June to facilitate post-assault unloading and reloading. Ships carrying the remaining five causeways were instructed to deliver the causeways to Pontoon Assembly Depot 4, SAMAR, upon being released from the present operation.

(i) The following Beach Parties were assigned for the operation:

Principal Beachmaster	Lt. Comdr. McKAUGE, RANVR
BROWN Beach 1	Beach Party 4, NBC "B", RAN
BROWN Beach 2	Beach Party No. 10, USN, Lt. MEYERS
GREEN Beach	Beach Party 3, NBC "C" RAN Sub. Lieut. ATCHINSON RANR
WHITE Beach	Beach Party 4, NBC "C" RAN Sub. Lieut. WILLSALLAN RANR
YELLOW Beach	Beach Party 5, NBC "C" RAN Lieut. RIGG, RANVR

All the above carried out their assignments satisfactorily. Beach Party No. 10, U.S.N. was withdrawn 14 June and returned to the Naval Base at SUBIC BAY.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

E. FIGHTER DIRECTION.

1. Organization.

- (a) Control of Fighter Direction for the BRUNEI Operation was in the Flagship, USS ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) with the USS SPENCER (CGC 36) being designated as Primary Fighter Direction ship when a breakdown occurred in the ROCKY MOUNT's Air Search Radar just prior to sortie. Fighter Direction for the Advanced Bombardment Group was in the USS BURNS (DD 588), and the USS NASHVILLE (CL 43), primary and secondary respectively. The USS MONTPELIER (CL 57), acted as primary and the USS DENVER (CL 58) as secondary for the Distant Covering Force. The destroyers, BAILEY, BANCROFT, PHILIP and WALLER with special Fighter Direction teams aboard controlled Combat Air Patrol over their individual convoys or acted as reporting ships in the objective area.
- (b) Upon the retirement of the SPENCER from the objective area on ZEBRA plus FOUR, 14 June, the BANCROFT was designated and acted as Primary Fighter Direction Ship until control was transferred to the 111th Mobile Fighter Control Unit at 1600, 15 June.

2. Narrative.

- (a) From the time of sortie on ZEBRA minus SIX, 4 June, from MOROTAI until arrival at the objective area ZEBRA Day morning, 10 June, no enemy activity was encountered; the several bogies reported and investigated during the approach proved friendly. The Combat Air Patrol consisted of four P-38s from 0730 to 1730 and two P-61s on station 0600-0730 and 1730-2000. Bad weather at base prevented Combat Air Patrol from being on station on several occasions. Shortly after daylight on ZEBRA Day a single enemy twin engine plane, undetected by radar, broke through the solid, low overcast in a highspeed flat glide over the Transport Area, dropped one bomb without damage to shipping and retired rapidly to the north. An attempted intercept when the bogey was reported 30 miles to the west and moving south proved unsuccessful. No other enemy activity occurred until the evening of ZEBRA plus THREE when a bogey was reported closing from the southeast. One P-61 was vectored out, SPENCER controlling, and made contact about 20 miles from the Transport Area. Bogey was identified as a NICK and quickly shot down. Subsequent bogies in the area came in the late evening when no Combat Air Patrol was on station. The night of 14 June combined ships' fire brought down one enemy aircraft that passed directly over the Transport Area and was illuminated by the shore searchlight batteries.
- (b) Since ZEBRA plus FIVE, 15 June, when Fighter Control was passed ashore to the Royal Australian Air Force Fighter Control Unit, the Fighter Direction ships have remained in a stand-by condition and acted as reporting ships to augment information of the shore-based radars.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

F. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Planning for the BRUNEI BAY operation was facilitated by the fact that most of the Australian officers were the same as had previously worked with this group in planning the TARAkan operation.
2. The greatest problem initially presented was the concept of multiple landings, the uncertainty as to just how many there would be and which units would be involved. It was recognized that there was no need for two Support Air Unit Commanders together with one primary fighter director for the entire area of operations. This together with the requirement of providing two naval gunfire shore bombardment organizations resulted in an unusually large frequency requirement for operations by an Amphibious Group.
3. A General Headquarters Communications conference was held in the U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT and sufficient frequencies were cleared to the various organizations concerned.
4. As in previous operations of this type many small units were in dire need of additional VHF radio sets. A shipment of twenty SCR-610's and fourteen MBF sets from Commander Service Force SEVENTH Fleet alleviated this condition so that all requirements were met.
5. Prior to issuing the M.B.F. sets each unit scheduled to draw was required to send its radio officer and leading radioman or technician to a lecture by the Group SIX Radio Material Officer on the proper method of installation and operation of the M.B.F. equipment. As a consequence excellent results were obtained with the M.B.F.'s. The only material failure was that one ship in installing its antenna parted the thick coaxial section lead at its junction with the antenna. This was repaired by ROCKY MOUNT and all holders of M.B.F. sets were advised to provide suspension support at the lower end of the thick coaxial section.
6. The only communication difficulty encountered in the staging area was a lack of alertness on the part of various small units in answering visual calls. Commanding Officers by scrupulous observance of article D-5204(2)(a) BuPers manual, which sets forth the signalling requirements for advancement in the seaman branch, can make all of his deck force capable of recognizing when the ship is being called and thus avoid embarrassment. Many frequency shift drills in which the ships of the various Assault Units were required to establish communication with their new net control stations, were held during the time spent in the staging area. These drills paid dividends during the Assault in that communications between the various Unit Commanders and the ships of their respective units were excellent. The policy of Group SIX has been to assign separate frequencies for LSM and LST types. As in previous operations, this policy has been proven sound by the lack of confusion on the two type channels that normally exists when the type commanders of two distinct types of ships

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

F. 6. (continued)

are endeavoring to control the movements of their types on a common frequency.

7. Communications enroute to and at the objective were in accordance with plan. Traffic was very light and circuit discipline was good within the naval forces. There were two instances, enroute to the objective, in which interference from Task Force 32 and 38 were encountered. Both occurred between 1330/I and 1530/I on 6 June when the TICONDEROGA was heard on 35.6 mcs and CTF 32 was heard on 34.8 mcs.
8. The equipment of the RAN Beachmaster was calibrated by this command for him and tests made with him during the rehearsal were entirely satisfactory. However, upon landing at the objective the RAN Beachmaster failed to establish his beach lateral and caused interference on the boat control common, and the BROWN Assault Unit common by unnecessary calling, repetition, and general unfamiliarity with our procedure. This was in marked contrast with the successful conduct of similar operations at TARAKAN by the same organization.
9. No radar jamming was attempted by the flagship of Commander Amphibious Group SIX, although three intercepts were made as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Ships position</u>	<u>Radar Characteristic</u>
5 June	04-35N, 125-16E	67/500/20-30
7 June	07-11N, 119-54E	68/500/35-40
9 June	06-04N, 114-50E	187/500/5

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

G. LOGISTICS.

1. Preliminary.

- (a) Logistic support for the Task Group was available at LEYTE, MANUS, HOLLANDIA, and MOROTAI. The principal staging was done at MOROTAI, where the resources of Service Force Representative (CTG 72.2) were well concentrated and in sufficient quantity to serve the purposes of the operation. In the few cases where certain items were not on hand, CTG 72.2 was most cooperative in having them sent by air or by shipping from other Service Force supply centers. The delay in the target date to June 10 afforded a valuable opportunity for ships to get emergency repairs and routine upkeep. In this connection, the repair unit under Commander W. N. PRICE, U.S. Navy, was particularly successful in rushing through a large number of repair jobs in time to meet the departure date of the Task Group.

2. Logistics at MOROTAI.

- (a) As the ships of Task Group 78.1 assembled at MOROTAI they were able to procure adequate dry provisions and meats, and a small amount of eggs and potatoes. A good supply of ships' store stock, clothing, GSK, and small stores was on hand at the Section Base, and in the USS GOLDSTAR (AG 12) and the USS BLOUNT (AK 163). YF 619 carried limited diesel spares.
- (b) The Section Base supplied 30,000 cases of beer, or sufficient for May rations for 30,000 men. Issue of June rations for some ships of TG 78.1, together with 1,000 cases for fleet issue at the objective (loaded on the USS ROCKY MOUNT) was made possible by the arrival of the USS AREQUIPA (AF 31) on 2 June.
- (c) Black oil was issued by the BANSHEE and BISHOPDALE, diesel by the MINK, TRINITY, and KETTLE CREEK, lube oil by the BANSHEE, MINK, BISHOPDALE, and Section Base.
- (d) Water was provided by piping from the Army Dock and from the Navy Dock. The arrival of the STAG (AW 1) eased a rather tight water situation. On 23 May a water barge arrived at MOROTAI and further facilitated distribution to ships.
- (e) A balanced load of ammunition was available on the SS DAVID J. BREWER and from LST 67, the logistics ships for the TARAKAN Operation, which arrived 16 May. In order to make up for a deficiency of 4.2" mortar W.P. and 5" 38 cal. W.P., the NEWMAN (APD 59) was sent to ZAMBOANGA to procure a supply from the USS PYRO (AE 1). The BREWER was ordered to MANUS by Commander Service Force, SEVENTH Fleet, and was relieved by the USS GADSDEN (AK 31). A supply of

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

G. LOGISTICS.

(e) (Continued)

Mark 29 fuses was received from LEYTE via LST 595 and delivered to destroyers of Task Unit 78.1.2. At LEYTE 500 barrels of fog oil were loaded on LST 632 for ships of CTG 78.1 and CTG 78.2. Immediately upon the arrival of LST 632 at MOROTAI, an LCT was used to off-load 150 barrels which were distributed to ships which had requisitioned them. The BREWER and the STAG had a good supply of smoke pots and floats, and all ships of the Task Group were ordered to fill their allowances.

(f) LST 473 was designated as the logistics ship for the operation. She was fueled and watered to capacity, and in addition carried 1100 tons of balanced ammunition, 50 tons of dry provisions, and a small supply of pneumatic lifebelts for issue at the objective. Five thousand lifebelts were also available in the GOLDSTAR, of which about 1000 were drawn by ships of the Task Group in order to fill allowances.

(g) Fifty tons of dry provisions for issue at the objective were deck-loaded on the WINOOSKI (AO 38). She also carried 100 barrels of 80-octane gasoline for fueling the LCMs in Echelon ABLE at TAWITAWI. After fueling this Echelon, the WINOOSKI proceeded to ZAMBOANGA, where she rendezvoused with Echelon DOG on 7 June.

3. Logistics En Route to the Objective.

- (a) The principal logistics activity en route was the fueling of the escorts by the WINOOSKI. This was done at formation speed, the black oil ships being topped off on 7 June and the diesel ships on 8 June.
- (b) Steering casualties were reported by LSM 68, SC 741, LST 573, the KANIMBLA, and the JOBB. These were repaired quickly, and no ships were forced to reduce speed. LST 937 made repairs on her port engine, LSM 52 required four hours to repair the fresh water header on her port engine, and SC 732 reported difficulty with her sonar training.

4. Logistics at the Objective.

- (a) As soon as their operations permitted on ZEBRA Day, the YMSs were directed to fuel from LSTs 473, 806, 912, 936, 937, and 942.
- (b) As of 17 June, the ACHILLES (ARL 41) had either begun or completed the following repairs:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

G. LOGISTICS.

(b) (Continued)

LCI 23	Main engine
LCI 29	Main generator, pump, ordnance
LCI 34	Pump repair
LCI 64	Main engine
LCI 65	Main generator and pump
LCI 68	Main engine and generator
LCI 74	Main engine, pump
LCI 431	Main engine, pump
LCI 577	Main engine
LCI 635	Main generator
LCI 661	Main engine
LCI 662	Main engine, shaft, propeller
LCI 667	Hull
LCI 697	Main generator
LCI 749	Main engine and generator, hull
LCI 778	Main engine
LCI 955	Main engine and main generator
LCI 958	Main engine and main generator
LCI 1000	Main engine and main generator, radio, ordnance
LCI 1071	Main engine and generator
LCS 46	Hull and radio
LCS 58	Main engine, propeller and ordnance
LCS 60	Main engine and main generator
FP 47	Main generator and ordnance
SC 741	Main generator
LST 1035	Radio
LCVP (LST 912)	Engine repair
ATR 61	Main generator
LCT 1310	Hull
LCT 1312	Main engine
LCT 1314	Refrigeration
LCT 1317	Main engine

- (c) Several other ships were under repair by the ACHILLES when the ROCKY MOUNT left BRUNEL BAY, but reports had not reached the flagship. The record of the ACHILLES demonstrates again the great value of this type of repair ship on an amphibious operation.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

G. LOGISTICS.

- (d) Because of the unexpectedly heavy fuel requirements of the cruisers, the WINOOSKI's black oil supply was exhausted by 16 June. Thereupon she was sailed to LEYTE for refilling, with the expectation that she would return to BRUNEL BAY by 21 June. The fueling of destroyers was taken over by the ROCKY MOUNT, whose large fuel capacity permitted complete topping off. Masters of the merchant ships present were contacted, and signified their willingness to provide up to 15,000 barrels if the need arose. Before the WINOOSKI sailed, the fifty tons of dry provisions on her deck were off-loaded into LST 473.
- (e) Prior to the departure of CTG 78.1, the officers on the staff of CTG 76.20 were provided with full information concerning the logistics of the operation, in order that the support of the remaining ships might be continued without a break. In all respects the distribution of provisions, water, fuel, and ammunition proceeded virtually as planned by the Attack Order.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

H. MEDICAL

1. Preparation for the Operation

- (a) Ships designated to care for and transport casualties were inspected and their need for additional personnel, equipment and supplies evaluated.

The personnel of the Australian transports (LSIs), with two (2) medical officers and eight (8) sick bay attendants each, were considered inadequate, hence they were re-inforced by ordering to each, one additional U. S. Navy Medical Officer and four (4) hospital corpsmen. The LSTs 612 and 102 requested and received one (1) and two (2) hospital corpsmen respectively.

All surgically-equipped LSTs were supplied with sheets for the use of their casualties. Cots, army litters, blankets and medical supplies were brought up to or above required operational level. Whole blood (288 units) was distributed among the casualty-handling ships, one day before sailing.

Re-supply of critical medical stores for the Task Group was obtained and placed aboard the flagship at LEYTE, prior to the previous TARAKAN operation. Small requisitions were filled by the USS GOLD STAR and U. S. Naval Section Base, MOROTAI.

- (b) An additional personnel problem was created by the fact that the landing was to be made on three widely separated beaches and directed by two Task Unit Commanders. Each commander designated one medical officer, from his respective unit, to act as staff medical officer in charge of casualty handling. This command assisted by assigning the U. S. Navy Beach Party No. 10, Medical Section, and two additional corpsmen to Task Unit Commander (CTU 78.1.16), Beach Brown, and one medical officer and 2 corpsmen to Task Unit Commander (CTU 78.1.18), Beaches WHITE and GREEN.

- (c) Frequent conferences were held with the medical officers of the 1st Australian Corps and 9th Australian Division. Subsequent to the preparation of the Medical Plan the scope of these conferences was widened by adding the medical officers of the two Task Unit Commanders, the Australian Beach Group, the Collecting Companies and Field Ambulances.

On 21 May 1945 the Attack Order A606-45 was distributed together with an extra copy of the medical plan for immediate re-issue to the medical officer of each ship.

A meeting of all Army and Navy medical officers involved in the operation was held under Navy auspices on 23 May 1945. All medical aspects of the projected operation, the details of the plan and the

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

H. MEDICAL

1. (c) (Continued)

joint responsibilities were freely discussed. It was apparent that, in spite of the repeated meetings and publication of written plans, many points needed further elucidation. This was accomplished by holding, aboard the flagship, three additional conferences with the officers directly involved.

2. Activities En Route

- (a) On 8 June 1945, a case of acute intestinal obstruction was transferred from the USS ROBINSON to USS ROCKY MOUNT. He was promptly and successfully operated on. An Australian soldier suffered an accidental fracture of the skull on 9 June on board the LST 637, but transfer to another ship was disapproved, since no immediate operation seemed indicated and medical officers were present aboard that ship.

3. Activities at the Objective

- (a) In the pre-landing phase on 8 June, the Underwater Demolition Team suffered 4 casualties on Brown Beach, (3 WIA, 1 MIA). On the same day the SALUTE, (AM 294), struck a mine and subsequently sank suffering 41 casualties, (4 KIA and 37 WIA). All casualties were treated on the USS PHOENIX, whence they were transferred, on 10 June 1945, to the USS BOISE for transportation to the rear area.
- (b) The landing was made unopposed on all three assault beaches. Three enlisted men, two Australian and one American, were accidentally wounded. Two during the landing of the first wave on GREEN Beach and one during the landing of the 2nd wave on BROWN Beach. One of the two GREEN Beach casualties had a ruptured spleen and mesenteric artery, and died in spite of transfusion and surgery within 30 minutes after injury.
- (c) Within the first day 27 patients were evacuated to ships of which 24 were battle casualties, and the remainder had routine illnesses.
- (d) ZEBRA plus 1 and 2 days were uneventful. Army medical installations were visited on all three beaches and assurances were received that they were at that time, medically self-sufficient.
- (e) The total casualties reported to the 9th Australian division for the period covered by this report, until midnight, June 12, were as follows:

Killed in Action - 1 Officer and 19 enlisted men.
Wounded in Action - 1 Officer and 45 enlisted men.

75

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

H. MEDICAL

3. (e) (Continued)

The following is a statistical analysis of the personnel evacuated by ships of this Task Group:

SHIPS	10 June 1945		11 June 1945		12 June 1945	
NAME	NAVY	ARMY	NAVY	ARMY	NAVY	ARMY
MANOORA				16		
WESTRALIA			1	6		
KANIMBLA				3		

I. INTELLIGENCE

1. Planning

- (a) A preliminary study of the BRUNEI BAY objective area was distributed to staff members on 25 April.
- (b) During the TARAKAN Operation, 2 officers and 1 enlisted man from the Intelligence Section were left at MOROTAI to assist in the planning of the BRUNEI BAY Operation.
- (c) A daily liaison was maintained with the Intelligence offices of the 9th Australian Division and the I Australian Corps, during the planning period.
- (d) Comprehensive weekly intelligence summaries and analysis of BORNEO and adjacent areas were prepared and routed to key staff members.
- (e) During the planning period and at the objective area the facilities of the Photographic and Map Reproduction departments were worked to capacity in fulfilling the requirements of Task Group 78.1, I Australian Corps, 9th Australian Division, and units attached. 389 negatives were developed and 2,701 prints made in the Photographic Laboratory. A total of 65,645 impressions were printed in the Map Reproduction Department.
- (f) Because of the widespread nature of the operation it was necessary to distribute a total of 45 different gridded maps of 1:25,000 and 1:50,000 scale. Distribution varied in accordance with anticipated needs of each ship and unit. The distribution also included Terrain Studies, Terrain Handbooks, extra copies of the Intelligence Annex to the Attack Order, extracts from Sailing Directions, British Admiralty charts, and various information booklets. Sufficient panoramas of beach obliques were distributed so that each Coxswain

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. INTELLIGENCE

1. (f) (Continued)

would have one available for study before the operation.

- (g) On the last three days en route to the objective area, film drops were received of strikes made on the days previous thereto. The prints were studied by Photo Interpreters to assess damage from recent bombing and to determine new or undiscovered defense installations. Additional prints were made available to the Intelligence Officer of the 9th Australian Division embarked.

2. Objective Area

- (a) Photographers were assigned to cover the landings on each of the three beaches. Another photographer was stationed on the flagship to cover other activities pertinent to the operation. A part of the coverage taken by these photographers is submitted in the photographic portion of this report.
- (b) Two Bomb and one Mine Disposal Officers from MEIU #1 were attached to this command, and their services were made available to the 9th Australian Division upon arrival at the objective area. In cooperation with the 9th Australian Division Engineers on LABUAN ISLAND, they disposed of or rendered safe much JAPANESE and some U. S. ordnance. The only JAPANESE underwater ordnance encountered was one type 93 Model 1 mine round washed ashore on the northeast coast of LABUAN ISLAND. No anti-boat mines, beach mines, or booby traps were found in the beach area, but several Jap bombs and dud U. S. bombs, rockets, and naval shells were encountered. Inland were found three JAPANESE bomb dumps with an estimated total of 200 tons of bombs, and numerous small bomb dumps with 10 to 15 bombs each. Two jeep trailer loads of remnants of seven different types of JAPANESE bomb fuses were found in a dump which had been bombed. Along some of the inland roads were found several types of hastily constructed land mines. Blocks of coral were also half buried in an effort to simulate land mines and delay the advance.
- (c) Subsequent to the landings all beaches were inspected to check the defenses reported by Photo Interpreters of this command. As anticipated, the defenses were light or non-existent. No occupied defense positions were found. Dummy AA positions were observed on WHITE and GREEN Beaches. Bunkered buildings were found on WHITE Beach, but were constructed only for storage or personnel use. Other bunkered buildings and one empty coastal defense gun position were found in BROCKETON.
- (d) On 2 & 3 Day the hulk of a JAPANESE Maru, grounded in VICTORIA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. INTELLIGENCE

2. (d) (Continued)

HARBOR, was examined for possible papers or other material of intelligence value. The search was negative from the standpoint of papers, but the ship itself revealed some interesting facts. The ship resembled the type Sugar Able, designed as a freight carrier, approximately 420 feet in length, and about 7,000 tons displacement. Dates marked on some of the installations indicate that she was probably completed in the Spring of 1944. There were indications that pre-fabrication had been used in her construction. It was interesting to note that little welding had been used, the ship being almost entirely a riveting job. The ship was found in a heavily damaged condition, having received many hits from air and surface units both prior to and during the Z Day bombardment. It was not possible to examine the engines and boilers as they were under water. The vessel had been gutted by fire, but it was obvious that she had been stripped of armament and other items of military value and abandoned by the Japs. It is almost certain that no fire could have been received from this ship on Z Day as was reported by various sources. No guns or gun wreckage were to be seen, and no ammunition, either live or expended was found. An after gun mount, however, was capable of supporting a 3" gun. No other gun mounts were observed. Numerous JAPANESE characters were painted on various parts of the ship, expressly forbidding smoking of any kind. This indicates that the ship may have been used to carry ammunition.

- (e) A daily news bulletin giving the latest information on activity at the objective area was sent visually to all ships present on the two days preceding the landings. On Z Day from 0800 to 1200 an hourly report was sent by radio to higher commanders. On ZEBRA and subsequent days, at 1800, a summary of the day's activities was sent to the same addressees.
- (f) Plots concerning all the BRUNEL BAY activities were maintained in the War Command Room. An additional front line plot was kept in Flag Plot.
- (g) Lieutenant Leslie B. GRAY, USNR, of Commander SEVENTH Fleet intelligence staff served on temporary duty with Commander Amphibious Group SIX staff and was of considerable assistance in this operation.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

J. PRESS RELATIONS.

1. The Press Unit was composed of the LCI(L) 635 and FP 47. These craft were provided by GHQ as headquarters and communications ships for the War Correspondents and Press Relations Officers. New stories were passed through GHQ censorship aboard LCI 635 and FP 47 was used as a communications link to Australia and Manila to enable early release of news stories. LCI(L) 635 was used for quartering and messing. A telephone cable was provided by the Press Unit and was rigged between the two ships when practicable for expediting press communications.
2. Prior to departure from MOROTAI for BRUNET BAY, War Correspondents and Press Relations Officers attended a briefing aboard the Flagship, USS ROCKY MOUNT. Admiral ROYAL, U.S. Navy (CTG 78.1; Major General WOOTTEN, GOC, 9th Australian Division; Brigadier WINDEYER (Commanding Officer, 20th Brigade); Brigadier PORTER (Commanding Officer, 24th Brigade); Captain HAINS, U. S. Navy, Operations Officer, CTG 78.1; Commander DECKER, U. S. Navy, Air Officer, CTG 78.1; described the details of the operations from the viewpoint of their respective fields.
3. Underway to the objective a daily bulletin was sent to all ships informing all hands, including the Correspondents and Press Relations Officers, of progress made by Minesweeping and Hydrographic Survey Units and the activities of the Cruiser Covering Group.
4. At the objective the Press Unit was assigned anchorages in an advantageous position. Four LCVPs were provided for easy access and free movement to points of interest.
5. Air transportation was provided by GHQ Courier Plane to and from BRUNET BAY for press matter and for the correspondents as authorized by GHQ. On ZEBRA Day news broadcasters flew to the objective from MANILA to interview responsible commanders and to inspect the beaches. They returned to MANILA the following day.
6. In addition to the Correspondents carried in the Press Unit, others were carried in the RAN transports, the USS ROCKY MOUNT, and a few other vessels.
7. Twenty-one Press Relations Officers and GHQ Censors, and 33 War Correspondents, were carried on board the ships of this Task Group to BRUNET BAY. United States, British and Australian newspapers, magazines, and news services were represented.
8. The PCE(R) 849 was tactically attached to the Press Unit but served as communications ship for GHQ.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

K. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Naval Gunfire Support

(a) Maps and Charts.

(1) Comment.

The grids on the various scale maps furnished for the operation did not agree. This required that the 1:72,000 and 1:50,000 maps be discarded entirely whenever there was a 1:25,000 map available. When the 1:25,000 map was not available, the 1:50,000 map was made standard. This same situation has prevailed in the TARAKAN operation conducted by this Command.

(2) Recommendation.

It is recommended that prior to an operation the most reliable and useful basic map be selected, and all scale maps be constructed from this.

(b) Red Smoke Pyrotechnic.

(1) Comment.

This pyrotechnic signal was fired by the close support craft as a signal to lift naval gunfire when the first wave was a certain distance from the beach. It is more effective than the white star clusters from support craft previously used. The parachute flares which were dropped by the air observer cannot always be depended upon.

2. Troops and Cargo.

(a) Unloading.

(1) Comment.

In spite of the difficulties and delays imposed by tidal and beach conditions, unloading was carried out in an expeditious and satisfactory manner. In general, early unloading was somewhat delayed until adequate shore party equipment was unloaded.

(2) Recommendation.

It will be the policy of this Group in future operations to load a few light cranes and dozers in the transport division or pre-load them in LCMs or LCTs in LSDs so as to insure this unloading equipment gets ashore early.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

K. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. Air Support.

On the whole, air support of the operation functioned smoothly, encountering only those minor problems of communication which are ordinarily anticipated and readily corrected.

(a) Comment.

The failure of the single B-24 squadron to bomb Area BAKER on ZEBRA Day constituted a major departure from plan, but was apparently inescapable due to a faulty bomb sight in the plane of the flight leader. This mechanical failure could not be repaired in time to permit the group to conduct its strike prior to D-15 minutes, and it was compelled to select Area CHARLIE as an alternative target.

Recommendation.

None.

(b) Comment.

The other three heavy strike groups scheduled to hit Area CHARLIE at 0830 began their mission 30 minutes late. The delay was unavoidable, however, for the three groups were forced to withhold their attack pending the correction of the bomb sight difficulty of the single group. Strikes could not be simultaneously carried out in the contiguous Areas BAKER and CHARLIE because of air traffic congestion and interference. The three heavy groups postponed their attack in the hope that the single group could recover the use of the bombsight in time to strike Area BAKER. Since this was not accomplished, all four groups joined to bomb Area CHARLIE beginning at 0900. As enemy defenses and opposition in both target areas was slight, the delay was not serious.

Recommendation.

None.

(c) Comment.

The misfortune befalling the underwater demolition team at BROWN Beach on ZEBRA minus TWO Day was clearly avoidable. The strike group leader violated instructions in failing to report to the Advanced Commander Support Aircraft. This identical failure to

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

K. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. (c) (continued)

report into the Support Air Direction Net and to obtain the needed clearance for pre-set strikes was encountered in both the Zamboanga and Tarakan operations, and 13th Air Force pilots were thoroughly briefed on the necessity of such procedure.

Recommendation.

That all pilots engaged in direct support of amphibious landings be thoroughly instructed as to the importance of establishing communication with Commander Support Aircraft and of receiving authorization for bombing attacks, pre-arranged or otherwise.

(d) Comment.

One B-25, in direct violation of both the air plan of Commander Task Group 78.1 and that of the 13th Air Force, and with no apparent purpose, flew the length of BROWN Beach some 50 feet from the ground at 0930 on ZEBRA Day. No permission was obtained from Commander Support Aircraft for such a flight, and the incident occurred during a critical period when the condition was "Flash BLUE".

Recommendation.

That all pilots be impressed with the danger of needless and unauthorized low flying over beachhead and transport areas.

4. Fighter Direction.

(a) Comment.

Failure of the one and only Air Search Radar aboard the flagship was somewhat balanced by the commendable work of the Primary Fighter Direction ship, SPENCER, in passing radar information to the flagship combat information center, but the extensive facilities of an AGC still proves the importance of retaining primary fighter control aboard the flagship.

Recommendation.

Installation of an SP radar at the earliest possible moment is recommended. In addition to providing altitude determination,

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

K. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

4. (a) (continued)

particularly essential in land-locked areas where minimum tracking and time for intercept is usually the case, it would serve as a stand-by for the SK radar.

(b) Comment.

All fighter direction units provided valuable information and smoothly assumed control as designated. The ROCKY MOUNT Combat Information Center personnel again contributed substantially in their part in evaluating radar plots, manning nets and providing surface information pertinent to various aspects of fighter direction.

5. Communications.

(a) Recommendations.

- (1) It is felt that a few additional voice radio code words should be added to those currently in use, the new words to have the following or similar meaning:

Your intercept on _____ mcs is a friendly radar.

Your intercept on _____ mcs is a harmonic response of a radar on _____ mcs.

Your intercept on _____ mcs is an image response of a radar on _____ mcs.

- (2) It is also felt that the addition of a voice call for "ALL SHIPS IN COMPANY EQUIPPED WITH RCM EQUIPMENT" would be a decided advantage since much valuable time is lost in calling several individual ships and telling them to "SADDLE UP" on the designated frequency.

6. Medical.

(a) Comments and Recommendations.

- (1) The group requisitioning of medical stores at main supply points and stowing it on the flagship, rather than counting on availability of medical supplies at the staging area, proved to be a good policy and is recommended.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

K. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

6. (a) (2) Having at the disposal of the Group Surgeon medical and hospital corps personnel on temporary assignment, permitted the greatest operational efficiency.
- (3) The smooth harmonious operation of the various ships' medical departments was largely due to the meetings, conferences and wide distribution given to the medical plan.

7. Intelligence.

(a) Hydrographic Charts.

(1) Comments.

It was necessary to distribute to the various ships and units of the Task Group a number of British Admiralty charts which covered the route from MOROTAI to BRUNEI BAY. In some cases the need for certain charts was so great that lithographic reproductions were made for issuance.

(2) Recommendation.

Measures should be taken to insure a greater supply of hydrographic charts of all types for issuance to shipping at the staging area.

(b) Target Charts.

(1) Comments.

A 1:25,000 chart of the BRUNEI BAY Area produced by the 2/1 Australian Army Topographical Survey Company was selected as the most desirable for bombardment purposes. It bore 1,000 meter grid squares with lettered divisions of 200 meters each. A 1:50,000 chart produced by the same organization had the same grid with an approximate 150 meter variance in position in certain localities because of a difference in the base maps used. Due to these variations only the 1:25,000 charts covering landing beach areas were distributed to firing ships. Since the surrounding areas were not covered by 1:25,000 charts, additional charts of 1:50,000 scale were furnished for orientation purposes. The remaining ships of the Task Group were supplied with both types of charts since possible errors due to the variations would not be dangerous.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

K. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

7. (b) (2) Recommendation.

Although gridded charts furnished were effectively used in conducting the operation, the units producing charts for a given operation should take measures to insure a uniformity in location of grids on charts of different scales. It is suggested that the same basic map be used for all charts produced.

(c) Photographs.

(1) Comment.

The aerial photographic coverage for this operation was very comprehensive. The black and white obliques and verticals were generally excellent in quality and sufficient prints were made available to fill all requirements. The colored vertical photography supplied was helpful during the planning stage.

PART VI

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. Personnel of the Task Group performed their duties in an outstanding manner.
2. Recommendations for awards will be forwarded separately.

PART VII

PICTORIAL SECTION

1. The following pages contain a pictorial representation of various phases of the Operation.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

PART VII

PICTORIAL SECTION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



1. Rehearsal at MOROTAI, 1 June 1945, for landing on BROWN Beach.



2. The first LST comes into BROWN Beach, 10 June 1945.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



3. Unloading on BROWN Beach, 10 June 1945.



4. Unloading on BROWN Beach, 10 June 1945.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



5. VICTORIA Town, LABUAN Island, indicating effects of aerial and naval bombardment.



6. VICTORIA Town, LABUAN Island, showing effects of bombing and gunfire.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



7. Unloading on WHITE Beach, 10 June 1945.



8. Piers on RED Beach, undamaged, 10 June 1945.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



9. Unloading on GREEN Beach, 10 June 1945.




10. Japanese seaplane on BROWN Beach. This plane had been shown in aerial photographs sometime prior to assault.


DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



11. Japanese Merchant Vessel aground in VICTORIA Harbor.




12. Looking aft from central superstructure Japanese Merchant Vessel.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



13. Looking forward from after superstructure on Japanese Merchant Vessel.



14. General of the Army MacArthur congratulates Rear Admiral Royal on LABUAN Island, 10 June 1945.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012



15. General of the Army MacArthur and Lt. General Morshead, General Officer Commanding 1st Australian Corps, during inspection of beaches on LABUAN Island about 1115/I, 10 June 1945.



16. Brigadier Porter and Captain Dugan (Chief of Staff, Amphibious Group SIX) at Brigade Headquarters, LABUAN Island, 10 June 1945, about one mile inland from BROWN Beach.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

File No. FE25/ A16-3
Serial No. FF-0263

SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California


JUL 7 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
ComPhibGrp 6 conf.
ltr., serial 0322 of
19 June 1945.

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT.
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force)
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
Subject: Action Report, CTG 78.1 (ComPhibGrp SIX) -
BRUNEL BAY, BORNEO Operation (10-17 June
1945).

1. Forwarded.
2. The planning, the cooperation of all concerned,
and the execution was excellent.


D. E. BARBEY

Copy to:
ComPhibGrp 6

7 05268

95

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3(F-3-4/whr)

Serial 04211

21 JUL 1945

REG. NO F-664
R. S. NO 7 05268
REG. SHEET NO 294

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on:
ComPhibGrp 6, Conf. Ltr.,
serial 0322, dated 19 June 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Action Report, CTG 78.1 (ComPhibGrpSIX) -
BRUNEI BAY, BORNEO, Operation (10-17 June 1945).

1. Forwarded.
2. The excellent planning and execution of this important operation is noted with pleasure.

T. C. Kinkaid

T. C. KINKAID

Copy to:
Com7thPhibFor
ComPhibGrp 6